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WILL THE “LEGAL SINGULARITY” HOLLOW 
OUT LAW’S NORMATIVE CORE?
Robert F. Weber∗
Abstract:
This Article undertakes a critical examination of the unintended 
consequences for the legal system if we arrive at the futurist dream of 
a legal singularity—the moment when predictive, mass-data 
technologies evolve to create a perfectly predictable, algorithmically-
expressed legal system bereft of all legal uncertainty. It argues that 
although the singularity would surely enhance the efficiency of the 
legal system in a narrow sense, it would also undermine the rule of 
law, a bedrock institution of any liberal legal order and a key source 
of the legal system’s legitimacy. It would do so by dissolving the 
normative content of the two core pillars of the rule of law: the 
predictability principle and the universality principle, each of which 
has traditionally been conceived as a bulwark against arbitrary 
government power.
The futurists heralding the legal singularity privilege a weak-form 
predictability principle that emphasizes providing notice to legal 
subjects about the content of laws over a strong-form variant that also 
emphasizes the prevention of arbitrary governmental action. Hence, an 
inattentive and hurried embrace of predictive technologies in service 
of the (only weak-form) predictability principle will likely attenuate the 
rule of law’s connection to the deeper (strong-form) predictability 
principle. The legal singularity will also destabilize law’s universality 
principle, by reconceiving of legal subjects as aggregations of data 
points rather than as individual members of a polity. In so doing, it 
will undermine the universality principle’s premise that the differences 
among legal subjects are outweighed by what we—or, better still, “We 
the People” who are, as Blackstone put it, the “community in 
general”—have in common. A cautionary directive emerges from this 
analysis: that lawyers should avoid an uncritical embrace of predictive 
technologies in pursuit of a shrunken ideal of predictability that might 
ultimately require them to throw aside much of the normative ballast 
that has kept the liberal legal order stable and afloat.
∗ Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. The author would 
like to acknowledge the generous support of the C. Boyden Gray Center for Study of the Ad-
ministrative State, as well as the helpful comments of participants and attendees at the Cen-
ter’s 2019 “Technology, Innovation, and Regulation” conference.
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The big challenge is, if eventually we do get to the point where the 
numbers do the predicting, do you start to short-circuit the [legal] 
process?1
Edward Bird, 
Chief Revenue Officer of a 
predictive legal analytics firm
[T]he proposition that tools are prolongations of human organs 




This Article will analyze the implications for the rule of law if the tech-
nological advances in the field known as predictive legal analytics evolve to 
such a degree that they are able to create a legal system bereft of all legal 
uncertainty. The term “predictive analytics” describes a wide-ranging as-
semblage of techniques and tools that learn from historical data to predict 
future behavior in order to drive better decisions and outcomes. Predictive 
analytics is part of a broader field of data science research. It applies new 
computational power, especially in connection with machine-learning, to 
obtain actionable insights from the massive amounts of stored data that only 
relatively recently became subject to programmatic analysis. Predictive le-
gal analytics consists of applications of predictive analytics to settings with-
in the legal system.
According to some legal futurists, predictive legal analytics will soon 
result in a “legal singularity”—a moment when the legal system finally 
overcomes the problem of legal uncertainty. The legal system will emerge 
as a completely specified, seamless legal order, accessible to all in real time. 
With the arrival of the legal singularity, anyone interested in exploring how 
the legal system bears on any completed or contemplated action will simply 
feed inputs into an algorithm that will produce law’s answer. These legal 
futurists maintain further that predictive analytics, in ushering in the legal 
singularity, will also empower legislatures, regulators, and transacting 
1. Barney Thompson, Big Data: Lawyers Play “Moneyball”, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 5, 
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/ca351ff6-1a4e-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21 (quoting Edward 
Bird, Chief Revenue Officer of a legal analytics firm).
2. MAX HORKHEIMER, Traditional Theory and Critical Theory, in CRITICAL THEORY:
SELECTED ESSAYS 188, 201 (Matthew J. O’Connell et al. trans., 1972).
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commercial parties of the future to draft completely specified statutes, rules, 
regulations, and contracts, all enforced by digital judges.
What would be the implications for the rule of law if the legal singulari-
ty arrives—that is, when it becomes possible to predict with certainty how 
the law applies to any and all persons in any and all circumstances? This Ar-
ticle invites the reader to a thought experiment that elucidates some implica-
tions of a potential legal singularity. Specifically, it asks the reader to imag-
ine a world in which all relevant legal data are impounded into a constantly 
updating algorithmic machine-learning software system that enables users to 
predict how the legal system will respond to any particular legal event. Such 
a technology will be computationally irreducible, meaning that the only way 
to obtain legal answers will be to run the algorithm.
3
It will be an inscruta-
ble black box that legal subjects can only experience through what computer 
scientists refer to as sensory interfaces—in this case, its concrete answers to 
legal questions—and we will find ourselves unable to apply our design intu-
itions to the improvement of its inner workings.
4
One can think of it as law 
on autopilot.
Some legal futurists assure us of the eventual rollout of just such a pre-
dictive analytic technology. This Article grants the futurists the factual 
premise that such a technology is on the horizon, although it does so only to 
explore the consequences of that result rather than to weigh in on its likeli-
hood.
5
It treats the singularity as an edge case scenario that sheds light on 
the possible consequences for law if predictive legal analytics reaches its 
apogee. To some extent, the mere fact that such an extraordinary scenario is 
up for discussion is just as important as the question of the likelihood of 
whether it will or will not actually materialize, and in exploring its implica-
tions the Article also implicitly sheds light on techno-futurist orientations to 
law more generally.
There are two distinct ways of analyzing a potential legal singularity. 
The first perspective—the optimization perspective—focuses on the singu-
larity as an efficiency-enhancing, problem-solving, instrumental technology. 
For instance, the legal singularity would reduce costs associated with the 
legal system by making many traditional modes of lawyering obsolete. It 
would forever change the nature of legal work, which would transform from 
3. Stephen Wolfram, Computational Law, Symbolic Discourse, and the AI Constitu-
tion, in DATA-DRIVEN LAW: DATA ANALYTICS AND THE NEW LEGAL SERVICES 103, 115
(Edward J. Walters ed., 2018).
4. See Steve Jurvetson, Technology Design or Evolution?: The Two Processes for 
Building Complex Systems Are Fundamentally Different, MIT TECH. REV., July 2006, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406033/technology-design-or-evolution (making this 
point with respect to artificial intelligence generally).
5. The technical impediments to the legal futurists’ predictions are probably overem-
phasized given the inevitable progress in reducing error rates and biased results, but the deep 
theoretical impediments are underemphasized—an imbalance that motivates, and underscores 
the importance of, this project.
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modestly productive professional expertise to hyper-productive software 
management. This perspective, prevalent among the futurists, originates in a 
preoccupation with scarcity, and is most active when, for instance, a law 
firm or corporation seeks to minimize costs, or a government agency seeks 
to streamline its budget. Since those are precisely the settings in which the 
legal system operates, the singularity would understandably command atten-
tion. Even more significantly, it would allow all legal subjects to arrange 
their future affairs more efficiently, safe in the knowledge of how the law 
will apply to them.
Nevertheless, the optimization perspective only scratches the surface of 
the legal singularity’s implications for the legal system. This Article 
acknowledges up front that the singularity would ceteris paribus enhance 
the efficiency of the legal system. However, it distinguishes and adopts a 
distinct jurisprudential perspective on the legal singularity that explores its 
potential unintended consequences. Exploring these consequences reveals a 
messier picture than the futurists have been willing to admit—a messiness 
attributable to the fact that predictive analytics not only offers new and effi-
cient tools, it also augurs an entirely new epistemology for society that will 
unavoidably impact the legal system.
6
In particular, the Article explains how the legal singularity, in fully real-
izing the optimization objective of maximal predictability, might in the pro-
cess undercut what have traditionally been the core constituents of the rule 
of law, thereby hollowing out much of law’s traditional normative core.
7
Deterministic, automated, discretion-free, rule-based, predictable systems 
abound in modern societies, and yet we do not describe those systems as le-
gal systems because they lack the normative foundation that a liberal legal 
6. The Article considers whether integrating this new epistemology into the legal sys-
tem might provoke effects that can be described as reflexive because they do not amount 
merely to changed practices within a largely static system, but rather they operate on the legal 
system itself, potentially changing what it is. In this sense, the questions examined here reso-
nate with the line of social theoretical inquiry known as “reflexive modernization.” See gener-
ally, ULRICH BECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION AND 
AESTHETICS IN THE MODERN SOCIAL ORDER (1994) (describing reflexive modernization as a 
process whereby society attempts to control the future using existing technologies and 
knowledge that cause unintended side effects that compromise the ability of those technolo-
gies and knowledge to perform their intended tasks); Jennifer Cobbe, On Legal Singularity 
and Legal Reflexivity, MEDIUM (Dec. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/@jennifercobbe/on-
legal-singularity-and-legal-reflexivity-bd96bcc4cda (explaining how “reflexive things bend 
back on themselves, with a circular relationship between cause and effect”). Though Hork-
heimer would have preferred the term dialectic to reflexive, it is in this spirit that the Article’s
epigraph is intended: to raise the possibility that “tools” (e.g., predictive analytics) might re-
flexively act upon “organs” such that the tools are no longer suited to act on the organs, which 
have undergone a fundamental change.
7. As discussed below, the derivation of law’s normative legitimacy from rule of law 
principles is only partial; other principles, especially democratic self-government, also play 
important roles.
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system enjoys. According to the self-description of liberal legal systems, 
that normative foundation depends in part on its adherence to a constellation 
of attributes referred to as the “rule of law.” This belief in the rule of law 
has august liberal roots in Locke and Rousseau, and it derives primarily 
from the principles of predictability and universality, both of which the sin-
gularity is likely to destabilize.
The predictability principle states that a liberal legal system must ensure 
that affected legal subjects can predict how the law will apply to them. But 
this predictability principle can be conceived of in two distinct formulations. 
First, a functional, instrumental weak-form principle, traceable to Hobbesian 
political theory, prizes predictability because it enables subjects to plan their 
affairs and thereby fosters social stability. Second, a normative strong-form
principle, traceable to Lockean political theory, values predictability be-
cause it operates as a check on the exercise of arbitrary governmental pow-
er.
Importantly, the strong form emphasizes law’s predictability as a pro-
cedural transparency device that restricts the government from enacting ar-
bitrary legal rules to which the citizenry did not and would not consent. It is 
not just that the laws must be discernible; they also must be comprehensible, 
intelligible, and amenable, at least in theory, to contestation. As Locke put 
it, the authorities must “own willingly” their exercise of governmental au-
thority, making it possible for the citizenry to demand reasoned explana-
tions for incursions in their otherwise natural rights to liberty.
8
Strong-form 
predictability, then, is in practice a precondition of the people’s informed 
consent to the social contract—which, in turn, is the touchstone of a free 
and liberal society in which people are not subject to arbitrary rule. Moreo-
ver, the reserve power of the people to revolt, so familiar to the experience 
of American political theory, lurks as a threat that disciplines the govern-
ment in the exercise of its powers.
However, the futurists heralding the legal singularity privilege a weak-
form of predictability over its strong-form variant. Their aim is to resusci-
tate, and indeed fulfil, the century-old legal realist project to expose the le-
gal system as consisting of nothing more than systematized prediction. Like 
the realists, they treat the legal system as any other social system, without 
any privileged claim to normativity. Similarly, they conceive of the legal 
system as a ready-formed thing that they would like to make susceptible to 
predictive analysis—as a data set ripe for empirical investigation, not as a 
social process that relies for its normative legitimacy on its scrutability and 
susceptibility to review and contestation.
Weak-form predictability is unobjectionable on its own. If nothing else, 
it facilitates efficient planning on the part of legal subjects—and that is im-
8. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 360 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690) [hereinafter LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT].
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portant. But weak-form predictability has no intrinsic connection to the core 
liberal ideal of non-arbitrary government and the rule of law. When futurists 
advocate for the use of legal analytics to enhance legal predictability, we 
should beware of the threat that an inattentive and hurried embrace of ana-
lytics in service of (only weak-form) predictability will attenuate the rule of 
law’s connection to the deeper (strong-form) predictability principle and its 
commitment to non-arbitrary government.
As for universality, the universality principle provides that the rule of 
law depends in part on law’s general applicability to all legal subjects. The 
techno-futuristic rush to banish legal uncertainty and usher in a completely 
specified legal system threatens to undermine the insistence that the law ap-
plies universally. An implicit bedrock of the universality principle is that the 
differences among legal subjects are outweighed by what we—or, better 
still, “We” who are, as Blackstone put it, the “community in general”
9
—
have in common. It implies a logic of political connectedness, however re-
mote or abstract. But the new epistemology of data science implies a logic 
of total differentiation, with each data point, including data concerning legal 
subjects, being unique.
The threat here is twofold. The first will preoccupy those of a critical 
bent: that the software realizing the singularity, in training itself on how the 
legal system works, would institutionalize and reproduce algorithmically the 
existing inequalities in the way the legal system treats its subjects. In the 
process, it would also threaten to belie and demystify the idea of equal jus-
tice before the law, undercutting the normative force the rule of law idea en-
joys in virtue of its general applicability. The second threat, on the other 
hand, strikes even deeper at the rule of law, and can be appreciated even by 
those disinclined to critical interpretations of the law. The problem here is 
not that the legal singularity cements in place an oppressive system of social 
relations. Instead, the issue is that the basic idea of universal rights might 
become unintelligible in the face of this epistemological shift that allows a 
newly algorithmized legal system to only see pulverized, atomized data 
points where it used to see integral, individual legal subjects.
The legal singularity, therefore, threatens to whittle away at the predict-
ability and universality pillars on which the rule of law has traditionally 
been thought to rest. However, it would also prompt us to reassess whether 
the rule of law would even matter in a futuristic legal system. Traditionally, 
the rule of law was considered necessary because it operated as a check on 
arbitrary discretion on the part of human government actors. At first blush, 
the legal singularity might seem to eliminate the discretion problem alto-
gether. Nevertheless, the price of solving law’s human discretion problem in 
this manner is high: casting aside, or at least fundamentally transforming, 
commitments to non-arbitrariness and universality. If the futurist response 
9. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44.
104 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:97
to the discretion problem is to imagine an algorithmic function that abstracts 
away from the human element of the law, have we solved the problem, or 
have we created a bigger problem of potential “algocracy”?
10
A critical and cautionary directive emerges from this analysis: that law-
yers should remain attuned to the possibility that an uncritical embrace of 
predictive legal analytics in pursuit of a shrunken ideal of predictability 
might ultimately require them to jettison much of the normative ballast that 
has kept the liberal legal order stable and afloat. Rule by algorithmic law 
hardly inspires the confidence in the liberal project that the rule of law for-
merly did. The legal singularity thought experiment, with its condition of 
the elimination of legal uncertainty, invites consideration of just such a re-
sult, which is the endgame for a futurist conception of law.
Still, although the rule of law contributes a significant degree of legiti-
macy to modern liberal legal systems, that contribution is distinct from con-
tributions made by other liberal values—including democratic self-
government, civil and political rights, and popular sovereignty. According-
ly, even if the legal singularity ends up depriving the legal system of the le-
gitimating effects that the rule of law provides, the legal system might com-
pensate by leaning on those other sources of legitimation for support. In this 
way, the legal singularity could catalyze a redoubled commitment to making 
the algorithmizing of the legal system amenable to deliberate forms of dem-
ocratic control. Confronting the possibility that a futurist legal system would 
undermine the rule of law as a legitimating force might help us to reinvigor-
ate—or even help to reinvent—legal liberalism. Legal technology could 
thereby become a site for a more general discussion concerning the appro-
priate conceptual and institutional forms that should underlie a technolo-
gized, twenty-first century liberalism.
The Article begins in Part II by introducing predictive legal analytics 
and the idea of the legal singularity. Part III sets forth the main argument 
that law will emerge from the legal singularity in a shrunken form, as a pre-
dictable, but frequently arbitrary, system lacking any privileged claim to 
normative legitimacy. It first examines the importance of the rule of law to 
liberal legal theory, focusing on law’s predictability and law’s universality. 
Next, it argues that the legal singularity will embody the weak form of the 
predictability principle and fulfil the legal realist project of conceiving of 
legality in terms of factual prediction alone—a circumstance that will sever 
law’s connection to the normative reservoir provided by strong-form pre-
dictability. Finally, it explains how the legal singularity will destabilize 
law’s universality principle by reconceiving of legal subjects in terms of da-
ta points rather than individual members of a polity. Part IV concludes with 
some reflections on how the legal system might develop institutional and 
10. John Danaher, The Threat of Algocracy: Reality, Resistance and Accommodation,
29 PHIL. & TECH. 245, 245 (2016).
Fall 2020] “Legal Singularity” 105
doctrinal forms to recuperate the normative force it would lose if the rule of 
law, as traditionally conceived, disintegrates with the legal singularity. Par-
ticular attention is given to the possibility of a joint project uniting both crit-
ical scholars and traditional liberals to reinforce the legal system against the 
danger posed by an uncritical embrace of legal technology.
II.  Predictive Legal Analytics
This Part introduces predictive legal analytics and the idea of the legal 
singularity. Section A begins by introducing predictive analytics generally. 
Next, Section B briefly discusses how predictive analytics and data science, 
in addition to offering powerful new instruments to achieve objectives, are 
by some accounts re-constituting the epistemological foundations of much 
of modern social life. Section C describes several applications of predictive 
analytics in the legal field. It also relates some of the extraordinary expecta-
tions of some legal futurists for the technology’s future development, in-
cluding the gradual evolution of a completely specified legal system that has 
eliminated all legal uncertainty, which some refer to as the “legal singulari-
ty.” Section D introduces a thought experiment of a hypothetical technology 
that embodies the legal singularity—an experiment that will allow us to ex-
plore the implications of predictive legal analytics for the rule of law in the 
Part that follows. Finally, Section E serves as a bridge to the next Part by 
distinguishing several other critical or skeptical orientations towards legal 
futurism from the jurisprudential critique presented here.
A. Predictive Analytics, Generally
The term “predictive analytics” describes a wide-ranging assemblage of 
techniques and tools that learn from historical data to predict future behav-
ior in order to drive better decisions and, ultimately, outcomes.
11
A similar 
industry formulation defines predictive analytics as the “use of data, statisti-
cal algorithms and machine-learning techniques to identify the likelihood of 
future outcomes based on historical data.”
12
These definitions embody prac-
tical, industry-focused perspectives, and the emphasis on these perspectives 
is intentional and unavoidable. As discussed below, data science and predic-
tive analytics were conceived as disciplines out of frustration with the lack 
of practical application of traditional statistics research.
13
Furthermore, the 
focus here on predictive legal analytics bears this out: to study this field to-
day is to investigate the practical application of technologies that have been 
11. See ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL 
CLICK, BUY, OR DIE 15 (2016).
12. SAS INST., https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/predictive-analytics.html 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2020).
13. See infra text accompanying note 19.
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more or less untheorized.
14
This Article seeks to contribute to the project of 
filling the gap between the legal practice and legal theory of predictive ana-
lytics.
I wish to highlight four implications of the representative definitions 
above. First, predictive analytics is, well, predictive. It is less concerned 
with understanding the causal environment out of which relevant events 
come to pass than it is with being able to predict what future events will 
come to pass.
15
It is not that causal inference is irrelevant to the problems 
that predictive analytics seeks to solve. Rather, the exponential increase in 
information expands the universe of variables to explore, but it also compli-
cates efforts to discern precise causal relationships.
16
As such, the practi-
tioner of predictive analytics focuses on predicting the future, rather than 
understanding the past.
17
The second attribute is related to the first: predictive analytics is fun-
damentally useful. In order to appreciate the usefulness of predictive analyt-
ic techniques, it is helpful to situate them under the broader “data science”
or “data analytics” umbrella. Reading through the burgeoning data science 
and predictive analytics texts,
18
one detects instantly an instrumental ethic 
that pervades the literature. Hadley Wickham, the renowned developer of 
software packages in the open-source programming language R, attributes 
the development of “data science” as a recognizable field of inquiry to a 
failure of statistics to apply itself to real world problems:
There are definitely some academic statisticians who just don’t un-
derstand why what I do is statistics, but basically I think they are all 
14. Of course, physical scientists have consciously operated in a data-constrained envi-
ronment for most of modern history. The Big Data revolution therefore offers to solve one of 
the main problems of science. Consequently, as one might imagine, the gap between theory 
and practice in scientific fields is less pronounced than it is in the legal arena, although it is 
still significant. For an example of a thoughtful and measured contribution to this literature, 
see Steve Kelling et al., Data-Intensive Science: A New Paradigm for Biodiversity Studies, 59 
BIOSCIENCE 613 (2009).
15. See Hal R. Varian, Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 
21–24 (2014).
16. Cf. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS 
FAIL—BUT SOME DON’T 249–50 (2012) (explaining how “exponential growth in availability 
of information” simultaneously provides for more testable hypotheses and increased difficul-
ties in individuating meaningful relationships in the data).
17. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction—or—How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry,
62 EMORY L.J. 909, 949–50 (2013) (“In comparing the sort of ‘mental models’ developed by 
human reasoners against competing algorithms, the question is simple: Can your model pre-
dict better than the leading existing approach? Whether the question is well posed or whether 
the causality is well understood is not particularly critical.”).
18. VINCENT GRANVILLE, DEVELOPING ANALYTIC TALENT: BECOMING A DATA
SCIENTIST 2 (2014) (“Books, certificates, and graduate degrees in data science are spreading 
like mushrooms after the rain.”).
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wrong. What I do is fundamentally statistics. The fact that data sci-
ence exists as a field is a colossal failure of statistics. To me, that is 
what statistics is all about. It is gaining insight from data using 
modelling and visualization.
19
Another commentator compares data scientists to the paradigmatic profes-
sionals of useful problem solving: engineers.
20
Thus, a data scientist is 
someone who “finds solutions to problems by analyzing big or small data 
using appropriate tools and then tells stories to communicate findings to the 
relevant stakeholders.”
21
Another finds that data scientists are distinguished 
by their emphasis on using data to extract information that leads to decisions 
and actions.
22
Unsurprisingly, this instrumental ethic, this drive to do something use-
ful, sometimes assumes entrepreneurial tones. For example, one data scien-
tist defines data science in terms of utility and value creation: “Data science 
is the transformation of data using mathematics and statistics into valuable 
insights, decisions, and products. This is a business-centric definition. It’s
about a usable and valuable end product derived from data.”
23
We will see 
later on how this entrepreneurial focus on producing something useful, 
while unobjectionable or even laudable as a first-order matter, can produce 
blind spots that disguise second-order consequences.
The third conceptual clarification concerns the relationship between 
predictive analytics and “Big Data.” Big Data refers to a phase transition in 
society’s relationship with data marked by heightened volume, velocity, va-
riety, and exhaustiveness of available datasets.
24
It is most helpful to think 
of the term Big Data as referring to the object on which the predictive ana-
lytic techniques are performed in order to achieve their insights, rather than 
to the techniques themselves.
Big Data’s relation to data science and predictive analytics is ambiva-
lent. On the one hand, it is the fuel of predictive analytics, the source of the 
data on which predictive analytics acts.
25
It is not that we live in a more da-
ta-rich moment in history; the data have always been there. The distinctive 
19. Dan Kopf, Hadley Wickham, the Man Who Revolutionized R, PRICEONOMICS (July 
24, 2015), https://priceonomics.com/hadley-wickham-the-man-who-revolutionized-r (quoting 
Wickham).
20. See MURTAZA HAIDER, GETTING STARTED WITH DATA SCIENCE: MAKING SENSE 
OF DATA WITH ANALYTICS (2016).
21. Id. at 13.
22. GRANVILLE, supra note 18, at 11.
23. JOHN W. FOREMAN, DATA SMART: USING DATA SCIENCE TO TRANSFORM 
INFORMATION INTO INSIGHT xiv (2014).
24. Rob Kitchin, Big Data and Human Geography: Opportunities, Challenges, and 
Risks, 3 DIALOGUES HUM. GEOGRAPHY 262 (2013).
25. See Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2017).
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“big-ness” of Big Data is that we can harness computational power and 
technique to store the data and subject it to analysis.
26
On the other hand, the 
sheer quantity of data—when n=all—threatens to overwhelm researchers, 
particularly with respect to causal investigations, as noted above.
27
One 
commentator expresses the relationship well:
Big Data and new data analytics enable new approaches to data 
generation and analyses to be implemented that make it possible to 
ask and answer questions in new ways. Rather than seeking to ex-
tract insights from datasets limited by scope, temporality and size,
Big Data provides the counter problem of handing and analyzing 
enormous, dynamic, and varied datasets.
28
The fourth and final implication to note for present purposes is that the defi-
nitions of predictive analytics are framed in terms of the questions they an-
swer rather than the instruments by which they arrive at those answers. Of 
course, the basic toolkit of predictive analytics—consisting of machine-
learning, artificial intelligence, and natural language processing technolo-
gies—is obviously important. Nevertheless, by abstracting away from the 
specific analytic techniques, these definitions elucidate the purpose of pre-
dictive analytics. This Article, therefore, asks the reader’s indulgence to 
forbear an elaboration of the dizzying array of complicated statistical and 
computer science techniques used in connection with predictive analytics.
29
B. Predictive Analytics as a New Epistemology
Predictive analytics does not simply refer to the application of expanded 
computational power to generate new data sets and analyze these new data 
sets (as well as older ones) more powerfully, although it certainly includes 
that. Predictive analytics also amounts to a new epistemology. It “changes 
the definition of knowledge” and creates a “radical shift in how we think 
about research,” effectuating “profound change at the levels of epistemolo-
gy and ethics.”
30
It “reframes key questions about the constitution of 
knowledge, the processes of research, how we should engage with infor-
26. See Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 873 (2016) (noting that emerging applications of 
predictive legal analytics “arise from the intersection of two trends: the collection of massive 
troves of individualized data about people in the United States and the explosive growth of a 
field of computer science known as machine learning”).
27. See GRANVILLE, supra note 18, at 41–42.
28. Rob Kitchin, Big Data, New Epistemologies and Paradigm Shifts, BIG DATA &
SOC’Y, APR.–JUNE 2014, at 1, 10.
29. For the curious, an excellent (but rather technical) primer is presented in KEVIN D.
ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS FOR LAW 
PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2017).
30. danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data, 15 INFO.,
COMMC’N & SOC’Y 662, 665 (2012).
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mation, and the nature and the categorization of reality. . . . Big Data stakes 
out new terrains of objects, methods of knowing, and definitions of social 
life.”
31
Technology author and entrepreneur Chris Anderson famously suggest-
ed that predictive analytics embodies a new empiricist epistemology herald-
ing the “end of theory” altogether—and along with it, methods of inquiry 
predicated on hypothesis and causality:
Petabytes allow us to say: ‘Correlation is enough.’ We can stop 
looking for models. We can analyze the data without hypotheses 
about what it might show. We can throw the numbers into the big-
gest computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical 
algorithms find patterns where science cannot . . . . The new availa-
bility of huge amounts of data, along with the statistical tools to 
crunch these numbers, offers a whole new way of understanding 
the world. Correlation supersedes causation, and science can ad-
vance even without coherent models, unified theories, or really any 
mechanistic explanation at all.
32
If we read through the messianic—if not perhaps equally apocalyptic—
tone,
33
Anderson’s remarks testify to an excited holding-out of mere predic-
tion as the ultimate objective of what used to be scientific, but now is purely 
technical, inquiry. With this new data epistemology, the need to develop, 
test, and understand a basic model of reality—what positivist science refers 
to as “theory”—disappears altogether.
34
We no longer need to understand; 
instead, we predict.
35
The new epistemology is a key marker of our in-
31. Id.
32. Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method 
Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory. When Ander-
son uses the term “theory” here, he refers to the testing of causal hypotheses predominant in 
empirical social scientific research. See also DAVID SPIEGELHALTER, THE ART OF 
STATISTICS: LEARNING FROM DATA (2019) (“[T]hese are technological systems that use past 
data to answer immediate practical questions, rather than scientific systems that seek to under-
stand how the world works.”).
33. Julie Y. Chu, The Noise of Data: Comments on Ewald’s “After Risk”, 7 CARCERAL 
NOTEBOOKS 109, 114 (2011).
34. See JOSHUA PEARL & DANA MACKENZIE, THE BOOK OF WHY: THE NEW SCIENCE 
OF CAUSE AND EFFECT 30 (2018).
35. Insofar as the data epistemology entails replacing understanding and discernment 
with prediction, it resonates with multiple influential currents in contemporary social theory, 
including Ulrich Beck’s “risk society” theory and Niklas Luhmann’s “systems theory.” See
ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 34 (Mark Ritter trans., 1992) 
(“We become active today in order to prevent, alleviate or take precautions against the prob-
lems and crises of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow—or not to do so.”); NIKLAS 
LUHMANN, THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 349 (Stephen Holmes & Charles Larmore 
trans., 1982) (characterizing the organizing principle of modern societies in terms of a transi-
tion from “memory” of the past to “prognosis” of the future).
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process transition from the Internet age to what Jack Balkin has labeled the 
“Algorithmic Society.”
36
French social theorist François Ewald characterizes the new data epis-
temology in terms of a tension that results from requiring ever greater ag-
gregates of data while also insisting on the uniqueness of each data point:
Knowledge, in the world of data, is produced based on a twofold 
requirement which, in other configurations, would appear contra-
dictory: on the one hand, we must gather the greatest amount of da-
ta (data that only exists en masse), the more the better; and on the 
other hand, they are treated one to one, without trying to erase their 
differences by integrating them into categories. It is a type of reso-
lutely nominalist knowledge, which bans the universal . . . . This 
tension is permanent in the epistemology of data.
37
By banning universal concepts in favor of limitless new distinctions among 
social actors, this new data epistemology inevitably “opens up a new politi-
cal universe” concerning how these distinctions are to be drawn.
38
In fact, in 
terms that evoke the opaque phraseology of his mentor Michel Foucault, 
Ewald argues that “‘[d]igital’ power-knowledge must be regarded as origi-
nal and in the process of transforming all power relations.”
39
When actors within the legal system (lawyers, law firms, judges, legal 
software vendors) harness the powerful and useful analytics toolkit, they al-
so participate in the same epistemological turn. And just as the data episte-
mology will inevitably occasion a new data politics, so too will it disturb 
settled theoretical and practical understanding in the legal field. Data scien-
tists, in their role as software entrepreneurs and consultants, are hard at 
work in churning out practical applications of these new technologies. They 
are “disturbing,” in the patois of the age. As is typical, though, the technol-
ogy disturbs and the law reacts,
40
both in terms of how the law responds to 
new technology and in terms of how the law understands itself in the light 
of the new technology.
41
The former process has already catalyzed interest-
ing debates about, for instance, professional responsibility in an era of arti-
36. Balkin, supra note 25, at 1219.
37. François Ewald, Omnes et Singulatim: After Risk, 7 CARCERAL NOTEBOOKS 77, 
84–85 (2011).
38. Id. at 81.
39. Id.
40. See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 
(2015).
41. This dynamic is not hard-wired into the social order. It is entirely possible to con-
ceive of societies asserting political agency to direct the productivity gains resulting from 
technological development in a manner consistent with the overall interests of the citizenry, 
much like governments in the early twentieth century prohibited attempts by industrial capi-
talists to use child labor. See WILLIAM MITCHELL & THOMAS FAZI, RECLAIMING THE STATE:
A PROGRESSIVE VISION OF SOVEREIGNTY FOR A POST-NEOLIBERAL WORLD 223 (2017).
Fall 2020] “Legal Singularity” 111
ficial professionals. This Article is concerned with the latter process, which 
has barely begun.
C. Predictive Legal Analytics
Adding the adjective “legal” to predictive analytics appears at first 
straightforward: it simply signals one particular field of application for these 
powerful instrumental techniques. Predictive legal analytics, then, refers to 
the business of predicting behavior by legal practitioners, officials, and in-
stitutions so as to drive better decision-making. At the most basic level, it 
involves deploying algorithmic computer systems (the “machine” in ma-
chine-learning) to “train” themselves through exposure to large datasets so 
as to infer rules “from the patterns it observes.”
42
It can be used by a wide 
array of actors who desire to predict how the legal system will impact their 
affairs. For instance, my own university has established a “legal analytics 
lab” that “analyze[s] millions of litigation filings and outcomes, corporate 
financial disclosures, patent applications and other legal documents to iden-
tify patterns and evaluate how the law operates to predict future out-
comes.”
43
The aim of this Article is to reflect a bit more on what the “legal” in 
predictive legal analytics means—on what special implications might follow 
from applying predictive analytic methodologies to the discipline of the law. 
To explore the potential depth of those implications, it uses as a test case an 
admittedly hypothetical, futurist thought experiment (the legal singularity). 
As such, it is not necessary to set forth an extensive taxonomy of the exist-
ing applications of these technologies; able treatments appear elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, this Section addresses two other matters that are necessary in 
order to appreciate the legal singularity’s possible implications. First, for the 
sake of context, it highlights a few particular first-generation applications of 
predictive legal analytics, inviting the reader to consider their practical ef-
fects on the practice of law. Second, and more importantly, it describes the 
perspective of so-called legal futurists, a group that extrapolates from these 
first-generation technologies to imagine how predictive analytics might 
transform and reinvent the legal system. This Section quotes heavily from 
the futurists not because their voices are the most prevalent among those in-
terested in predictive legal analytics, but rather because their project is 
transformational and their ideas require engagement from anyone interested 
in the future of the legal system.
42. Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 679 
(2017).
43. GA. STATE UNIV. LEGAL ANALYTICS LAB, https://robinson.gsu.edu/academic-
departments/insight/innovation-labs/legal-analytics-lab (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
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1. First-Generation Applications
These first-generation applications open up opportunities for lawyers, 
judges, and regulators to better understand how the legal system actually 
works in practice, as well as for legal subjects to more reliably plan their af-
fairs based on an understanding of what the law requires. Machine-learning 
algorithms are already outperforming humans in the task of accurately pre-
dicting Supreme Court decisions.
44
And researchers are using natural lan-
guage processing and machine-learning to build successful predictive mod-
els of other courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights.
45
While many of these first-generation applications of predictive analytics 
focus on forecasting the outcome of court cases, they are by no means lim-
ited to that relatively narrow context. For instance, applications such as 
IBM’s Ross are able to answer legal questions posed by users with astonish-
ing accuracy, even providing citations and suggestions for further reading.
46
Governments have for some time used assistive, facilitative predictive ana-
lytics tools to help allocate enforcement and adjudicatory resources.
47
Some 
governments are even experimenting with machine-learning systems to au-
tomatically generate binding legal orders—what legal researchers Cary 
Coglianese and David Lehr call “rulemaking by robot.”
48
With all this tech-
nological development, futurists hypothesize that we may look back at the 
twentieth century and wonder how we ever found it acceptable to maintain a 
legal system without machine-learning algorithms.49
That said, even the more modest legal technologists acknowledge how 
predictive legal analytics will change the practice of law. Thus, for instance, 
Harry Surden tells us that “statistical and other heuristic-based automated 
assessments of data can sometimes produce automated results in complex 
[legal] tasks that, while potentially less accurate than results produced by 
44. See Daniel M. Katz et al., Predicting the Behavior of the United States Supreme 
Court: Toward a General Approach, PLOS ONE (Apr. 12, 2017), https://journals.plos.org
/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0174698.
45. Nikolaos Aletras et al., Predicting Judicial Decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights: A Natural Language Processing Perspective, PEERJ COMPUT. SCI. (Oct. 24, 
2016), https://peerj.com/articles/cs-93.
46. See ASHLEY, supra note 29, at 351–52.
47. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2019) (referring to “adjudication by algorithm”); see also Daniel E. 
Ho & David F. Engstrom, Algorithmic Accountability in the Administrative State 8–22 
(Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State Working Paper 19–34, 2019), 
https://administrativestate.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2019/11/Engstrom-Ho-
Algorithmic-Accountability-in-the-Administrative-State.pdf.
48. See Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Rulemaking by Robot: Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1171 (2017).
49. See Benjamin Alarie et al., Regulation by Machine, Symposium, Machine Learning 
and the Law, NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.mlandthelaw.org
/papers/alarie.pdf.
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human cognitive processes, can actually be sufficiently accurate for certain 
purposes that do not demand extremely high levels of precision and accura-
cy.”
50
And John McGinnis and Steven Wasick predict that improvements in 
computing power will lead to an increasing legislative preference for stand-
ards over rules, as well as “dynamic rules” that are adjusted with increasing 
frequency as algorithms process new information.
51
These technologies have 
experienced uptake in private sector alternative dispute resolution settings 
too.
52
Barring an unlikely aggressive approach by state bar regulators, these 
changes are forthcoming no matter what the lawyers themselves have to 
say.
53
In fact, the predictive analytics turn is as much a demand-side phe-
nomenon as it is a supply-side phenomenon. Lawyers might be prone to a 
little navel-gazing when they survey the innovative analytics technologies 
that their peers are developing in coordination with data scientists. But the 
fundamental marketplace reality is that clients “are increasingly asking for 
probability-based terms to express outcomes.”
54
What these clients are asking for, in effect, is a prediction for how the 
law applies to their situations. The initial forays into the predictive legal an-
alytics world aim at forecasting the outcomes of actual disputes. Lex 
Machina is a big player in this arena. It touts itself as representing a “para-
digm shift for lawyers.”
55
Its website tells us, “[f]or the first time, lawyers 
can combine insights gleaned from bottom-up data with traditional top-
down controlling authority found in statutes, rules, and court opinions.”
56
Lex Machina promises to “gain actionable insights across the data that is 
relevant to your strategic question.”
57
These insights might pertain to judges, 
venues, opposing counsel, prospective counsel, adverse party strategy, and 
damages. It advertises its ability to instantly assess a user’s chances of win-
50. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 115 (2014); see 
also Harry Surden, The Variable Determinacy Thesis, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1
(2011) (taxonomizing types of legal decision-making according to the degree of indetermina-
cy they entail for purposes of identifying which decision types are susceptible to computer 
automation).
51. See John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA. L. REV. 991, 
1039–48 (2015).
52. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS, REBOOTING JUSTICE: MORE 
TECHNOLOGY, FEWER LAWYERS, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW (2017).
53. For a thoughtful discussion of the impact of unauthorized practice of law rules on 
emerging legal technology (including predictive analytics), see Dana Remus & Frank Levy, 
Can Robots be Lawyers? Computers, Robots, and the Practice of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 501 (2017).
54. Thompson, supra note 1, at 7.
55. What We Do, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 
3, 2019).
56. Id.
57. What’s Different, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do/whats-
unique (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
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ning a case based on how many times the opposing lawyer has filed a cer-
tain type of lawsuit, in which court, with what success rate, whom that law-
yer has represented, and which opposing counsel that attorney has faced.
58
Ravel, another predictive legal analytics provider, promises similar insights 
regarding the behavior of individual judges and specific courts and law 
firms.
59
Predictive legal analytics software for cash bail and sentencing have 
also already been integrated into the American lawyer’s workaday toolkit.
60
Other researchers are using predictive legal analytics to improve judi-
cial performance.
61
For instance, Daniel Chen explains a new research pro-
gram of “predictive judicial analytics” that aims to de-bias judicial decision-
making and increase what he calls the “fairness of law.”
62
Researchers have 
established that machine-learning can be used to automatically detect cir-
cumstances where the decisions of judges, or even those of a particular 
judge, are likely to be affected by irrelevant factors. In response, targeted 
interventions, such as judicial education programs or automated red-flag
systems alerting the judge to the potential of bias, may be designed to de-
bias decisions at early stages of the proceedings. Chen’s efforts here testify 
that computational methods can create visibility, which is required if we 
want to spot bias.
63
They also demonstrate the flexible potential for predic-
tive legal analytics, with resources and institutional support, to promote le-
gal values and even transformative social change as these technologies de-
velop.
2. The Futurist Perspective
Most lawyers can grasp the feasibility of these first-generation analytics 
applications, as well as the evident efficiency enhancements they entail for 
the lawyers, organizations, citizens, courts, legislatures, and administrative 
agencies that would use them. But to the legal futurists, they are but a prel-
ude to a revolutionary re-conceptualization of what it means to practice 
law—”a new form of law” altogether.
64
They are precursors to the apotheo-
58. See Thompson, supra note 1, at 7.
59. Products and Technology, RAVEL, https://home.ravellaw.com/products (last visited 
Oct. 3, 2019).
60. See, e.g., Alexei Koseff, Jerry Brown Signs Bill Eliminating Money Bail in Califor-
nia, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 29, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article217461380.html.
61. See Daniel L. Chen, Machine Learning and the Rule of Law, in LAW AS DATA:
COMPUTATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 433 (Michael A. Livermore & 
Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019).
62. Id.
63. I owe this phrasing to my colleague Charlotte Alexander.
64. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND.
L.J. 1401, 1401 (2017); see also Daniel Goldsworthy, Dworkin’s Dream: Towards a Singu-
larity of Law, 44 ALT. L.J. 286, 289 (2019) (“[S]ynthesizing incomprehensible volumes of 
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sis of law-as-prediction in the form of the “legal singularity,” or the “com-
pletely-specified” legal system, or “complete law,” or the “self-executing”
legal system.
Anyone paying attention to the legal profession in recent years is famil-
iar with pronouncements that the “practice of law is going through its most 
dramatic change since laws were written down.”
65
Legal futurist Richard 
Susskind, using only a slightly more modest look-back period, announced to 
fanfare that “legal institutions and lawyers are at a crossroads . . . and will 
change more radically in less than two decades than they have over the last 
two centuries.”
66
Predictive legal analytics should be thought of as a core 
pillar of this radically changed legal system. The physicist Max Tegmark, 
co-founder of the Future of Life Institute, speculates that artificial intelli-
gence technologies might eventually bring about the full automation of the 
legal system:
Since the legal process can be abstractly viewed as computation, 
inputting information about evidence and laws and outputting a de-
cision, some scholars dream of fully automating it with robojudges: 
AI systems that tirelessly apply the same high legal standards to 
every judgment without succumbing to human errors such as bias, 
fatigue or lack of the latest knowledge.
67
According to legal futurist Benjamin Alarie, rapidly evolving technological 
developments in predictive legal analytics will soon result in a “legal singu-
larity.” He borrows the “singularity” term from Vernor Vinge, who used it 
to describe the “imminent creation by technology of entities with greater 
than human intelligence.”
68
The idea of the singularity is a conceptual cog-
nate of the attainment of “general AI,” “artificial general intelligence,” or 
“strong AI.”
69
Whereas the singularity overcomes the limits of human intel-
judgments and theoretical analysis no longer remains an impossibility, but a technical problem 
to be solved.”).
65. Matthew Stubenberg, Better Position Yourself for the Legal Technology Wave, 23 
TYL 5, 5 (2019).
66. RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROW’S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR 
FUTURE xvii (2d ed. 2016).
67. MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 105 (2017).
68. Vernor Vinge, The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-
Human Era, in VISION-21: INTERDISCIPLINARY SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING IN THE ERA OF 
CYBERSPACE 11, 12 (NASA Conference Publication 10129, 1993); see also Simon Deakin & 
Christopher Markou, From Rule of Law to Legal Singularity 6 (Univ. of Cambridge Fac. 
Rsch. Paper, Apr. 30, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589184 (describing the legal singular-
ity as a “credible interpolation” of utopian AI projects).
69. See Michael Feldman, The Singularity Is Nearer: Microsoft Places $1 Billion Bet 
on Artificial General Intelligence, THE NEXT PLATFORM (July 26, 2019), 
https://www.nextplatform.com/2019/07/26/the-singularity-is-nearer-microsoft-places-1-
billion-bet-on-artificial-general-intelligence.
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ligence, the legal singularity will overcome the problem of legal uncertain-
ty:
The legal singularity will arrive when the accumulation of a mas-
sive amount of data and dramatically improved methods of infer-
ence make legal uncertainty obsolete. The legal singularity con-
templates complete law . . . . The legal singularity contemplates . . .
the emergence of a seamless legal order, which is universally ac-
cessible in real time . . . . The law will be functionally complete.
70
With the arrival of the legal singularity, anyone interested in exploring how 
the legal system bears on a contemplated action will simply feed variables 
into an algorithm that will produce law’s answer. At the 2019 meeting of 
Stanford Law School’s annual FutureLaw conference, a panel moderator 
framed the discussion by observing that some people think we will eventu-
ally “reach legal singularity, where we can predict every case with perfect 
confidence.”
71
Although most of the early work in predictive legal analytics repeats the 
seemingly ineradicable urge of lawyers to focus on litigation activity, the 
futurists maintain that analytics will also empower “robo-legislators,”
72
reg-
ulators, and transacting commercial parties of the future to draft completely 
specified rules and contracts. We are invited to imagine the legal system as 
a dynamic collection of “microdirectives,” where lawmakers enact a “cata-
log of precisely tailored laws, specifying the exact behavior that is permitted 
in every situation.”
73
With the benefit of virtually unlimited data and power-
ful predictive technologies, legislators will “have enough information to an-
ticipate virtually all contingencies, such that laws are perfectly calibrated to 
their purpose.”
74
“Digital courts” running on blockchain platforms will en-
force contracts without any involvement of judges.
75
Stephen Wolfram provides one of the frankest explications of the impli-
cations of futurism for the legal system. Wolfram proposes that it will be 
possible to develop a fully symbolic and computer programmable human 
language to supplant natural language. In the process, “the whole spectrum 
70. Benjamin Alarie, The Path of the Law: Towards Legal Singularity, 66 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 443, 445–46 (2016).
71. Stanford Law School, FutureLaw 2019 | The Future of Legal Tech, Civil Proce-
dure, and the Adversarial System, YOUTUBE (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=bGNNiy99I7c&t=470s.
72. TEGMARK, supra note 67, at 107.
73. Casey & Niblett, supra note 64, at 1402.
74. Id.
75. See Hitoshi Matsushima & Shunya Noda, Mechanism Design with Blockchain En-
forcement (KIER Working Papers 1027, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3554512 (using mechanism design theory to theorize an algorithmic judiciary that 
incentivizes agents to input accurate information into smart contract computer programs to 
ensure optimal contract enforcement).
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of activities covered by law becomes potentially accessible to structured 
computation.”
76
His focus is on contract, but he acknowledges that his ideas 
apply to public law as well. In both contexts, the law displays an algorith-
mic logic: “Typically a contract defines some model of the world, and spec-
ifies what should happen in different situations.”
77
He predicts a sort of re-
turn to the origins of the codex, the Latin word denoting the systematic 
collection of legal rules. The word code was repurposed two millennia later 
by computer scientists to refer to the systematic rules for operating comput-
ers. Now, the challenge is to “put all those legal codes and contracts into 
computational form,” using a universal, programmable symbolic discourse 
language—to use computer code to implement and enforce new legal codes 
of the future.
78
At that point, the legal system could, in principle, be gov-
erned entirely by artificial intelligence. At that point, the system would 
reach computational irreducibility, a condition obtaining when “there really 
isn’t any way to see what will happen much more efficiently than just by 
running [the machine-learning algorithm].”
79
Law will become self-
executing, like a computer algorithm, across all its applications.
80
D. Introducing the Singulatim Software as a Thought Experiment
Imagining the legal singularity allows us to exhume an old debate about 
the legal order of liberalism itself.
81
In the seventeenth century, advocates of 
the divine right of kings maintained that monarchs wrote and published 
general laws only because their limited attention and knowledge prevented 
them from writing a fully specified legal code for all of their legal sub-
76. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 126.
77. Id. at 120.
78. Id. at 109.
79. Id. at 115.
80. See Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automa-
tion, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019) (describing, but neither predicting nor advocating, 
this position).
81. A disclaimer is in order here: today, liberalism can be an intractably broad concep-
tual category. Indeed, there is some sense in which it is our only category. See DUNCAN BELL,
REORDERING THE WORLD: ESSAYS ON LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE 70 (2016); Raymond Geuss, 
Liberalism and Its Discontents, 30 POL. THEORY 320, 320-21 (2002); Thomas Nagel, Rawls 
and Liberalism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 62 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). 
Nevertheless, all formulations of liberalism make recourse to a core set of principles—
including autonomy, consent, equality, pluralism, and liberty—that distinguish liberalism 
from prior historical traditions predicated on inherited traditions and hierarchies. Indeed, these 
principles are so attractive as to be foundational to, and constitutive of, almost all perspectives 
on modern social and political life. As a consequence, this disclaimer, while acknowledging 
the importance of precision in the deployment of concepts like liberalism, also underscores the 
potential significance of decreased confidence in the principles (like the rule of law) that sup-
port liberalism as a political philosophy.
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jects.
82
Early liberals like John Locke were outraged by this line of argu-
ment, instead viewing the generality of law as a prerequisite for liberty and 
a bulwark against arbitrary government.
83
However, both the authoritarian 
monarchists and the early liberals shared an assumption that, in any event, 
the limits of human cognition rendered it epistemically impossible to con-
ceive of a predictable, but not general, system of laws—a comprehensive 
code that always answers the question “how exactly does the law apply in 
these circumstances?”
Writing three centuries later but well before predictive legal analytics, 
Ronald Dworkin, one of the twentieth century’s preeminent legal theorists, 
demonstrates the persistence of this epistemic gap with a thought experi-
ment. Dworkin asks his reader to hypothesize a mythical Justice Hercules 
who is finally able to overcome the cognitive limitations and time con-
straints of mere mortal jurists and discern the one right answer to all legal 
questions.
84
On this view, only a divine intervention can give us precise, ac-
curate answers to every legal question. This view clashes with the view of 
those legal futurists who predict that the legal singularity will signal that the 
epistemic gap has finally been bridged—albeit by technological, rather than 
divine, means.
This Article asks the reader to participate in a counterfactual thought 
experiment in imagining a technology that does not yet exist, and that many 
believe cannot exist in the future. Nevertheless, such an exercise is fruitful 
because it allows us to imagine the consequences of the futurists’ an-
nounced project to create a completely specified predictive legal system. 
The hypothetical technology will be called the “Singulatim” software.
85
The 
Singulatim software would allow a user to input parameters relevant to a 
matter to generate a probabilistic assessment of how the legal system would 
be expected to apply to the problem. It would offer actionable insights to 
individuals, businesses, non-government organizations, legislatures, admin-
istrative agencies, and courts. Its operations would achieve a perfectly pre-
dictable legal system no longer saddled with the twin problems of discretion 
and uncertainty that have occupied so much energy in legal theory debate.
86
The applications of the Singulatim software would be limited only by 
the extent of the user’s curiosity in imagining settings in which the legal 
82. See, e.g., ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 45–47 (Johann P. 
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1680).
83. Indeed, John Locke’s First Treatise of Government is an express refutation of 
Filmer’s monarchism. See LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, passim.
84. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239–40 (1988).
85. The name is intended to remind the reader of the legal singularity embodied in the 
program, as well as to invoke the word’s Latin meaning “one by one, singly, or separately,”
which captures the operative logic of the new data epistemology, discussed above in Section
II.B, of which the predictive legal analytics revolution is an expression.
86. See infra Part III.B for a discussion on the relationship between uncertainty and 
discretion in legal theory.
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system comes into play. For example, the Singulatim software would permit 
an electric utility to supply details of a proposed nuclear power plant project 
in order to prepare a license application that will be as likely as possible to 
receive regulatory approval. It would empower a products liability defend-
ant to formulate expectations concerning the extent of its potential liability 
for producing a product known to cause harm, both in general and with re-
spect to specific venues to which it might credibly transfer cases. It would 
also allow a municipality to set an optimal speed limit, even dynamically, at 
a busy intersection based on data relating to driver behavior and enforce-
ment practices. It would enable a legislature to encode a system of dynamic 
rules to determine whether a business’s workers are properly categorized as 
employees or independent contractors based on the legislature’s policy as-
sessment of the factors that ought to govern that determination. It would al-
low a community non-profit to provide real-time guidance to young black 
men in heavily policed neighborhoods in order to limit encounters with the 
legal system and maximize the availabilities of defenses in the case of such 
encounters. In proceeding through the Article’s argument about the implica-
tions of the legal singularity, the reader is invited to think of the Singulatim
software as the immaterial, institutional embodiment of the singularity.
E. Distinguishing This Intervention from Other Critical and 
Skeptical Perspectives
After introducing the prospect of such a radical technology, some clear-
ing of the conceptual thicket is necessary in order to contextualize the ar-
gument presented in the following Part, which is the Article’s centerpiece. 
In particular, the argument here should be distinguished from two related 
but distinct reactions to the idea of legal singularity. First, some readers 
might advance a sensible technical objection: “but that can’t possibly hap-
pen, can it?” Indeed, some observers of legal futurism argue that important 
elements of legal practice will resist the analytics turn—that something like 
the legal singularity is unlikely to ever materialize.
87
Some of these skeptics 






87. See, e.g., Cobbe, supra note 6 (“I should say at the outset that I don’t believe in the 
legal singularity. Machine learning systems are too flawed for it to come about anytime soon, 
if ever.”); Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of Outcome 
Prediction in the Practice of Law, 123 PENN. ST. L. REV. 41, 96–97 (2018) (“[I]t is premature 
to say that [predictive legal analytics] will replace these traditional tools in the near future; 
rather, predictive analytics can be expected to complement the traditional tools of outcome 
prediction.”); Lisa A. Shay et al., Do Robots Dream of Electric Laws? An Experiment in the 
Law as Algorithm, in ROBOT LAW 274 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
88. See MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS 
MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD (2018).
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tionism.”
90
For others, imagining the shift from our current legal-technical 
ecosystem to the legal singularity requires a great deal of abstraction—so 
much that it might be difficult to even engage with the implications of the 
admittedly distant prospect of singularity.
More concretely, labor economist David Autor, a leading researcher on 
workplace automation, argues that the substitution process by which ma-
chines replace human workers is necessarily finite because humans (perhaps 
especially those performing judgment-rich tasks like lawyers) possess a sig-
nificant amount of tacit knowledge that will resist codification.
91
Economic 
historian Aaron Benanav has recently questioned the entire techno-futurist 
narrative depicting a process of runaway technological innovation that fuels 
productivity advances, revolutionizes industries, stokes economic growth, 
and sloughs off whole categories of workers into obsolescence. Benanav ar-
gues instead that productivity growth has lagged in recent decades relative 
to historical trends, and that the real reason for declining employment and 
real wages across nearly all sectors is overcapacity and slow output 
growth.
92
If this general account is accurate, automation discourse exagger-
ates the effects of artificial intelligence and robotics, and disguises deeper 
structures at work in the early twenty-first century economy, including the 
legal sector. And yet, while these debates continue, every year legal authori-
ty is expressed increasingly in algorithmic terms,
93
as developers (both hu-
man and artificial) work to steadily reduce error rates and biases in predic-
tive technologies.
94
In any event, the analysis presented here takes the stated 
objectives of legal futurism seriously, if for no other reason than to critique 
their implications.
89. Richard Barbrook & Andy Cameron, The Californian Ideology, 6 SCI. AS CULTURE
44, 45 (1996) (decrying naïve idealism of the “profound faith in the emancipatory potential of 
the new information technologies”).
90. See EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM 5 (2013) (adopting term “solutionism” to refer to the “ideol-
ogy that legitimizes and sanctions” the “[r]ecasting [of] all complex social problems either as 
neatly defined problems with definite, computable solutions or as transparent and self-evident 
processes that can be easily optimized”).
91. See David H. Autor, Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of 
Workplace Automation, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 11 (2015); David H. Autor, Polanyi’s Paradox 
and the Shape of Employment Growth, in RE-EVALUATING LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS: A
SYMPOSIUM SPONSORED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY 129 (2014).
92. See Aaron Benanav, Automation and the Future of Work—1, 119 NEW LEFT REV. 5
(2019). Benanav is indebted to his adviser Robert Brenner’s work studying “overcapacity” as 
a prime cause of slow economic growth and innovation in the world economy. See Robert 
Brenner, What Is Good for Goldman Sachs Is Good for America: The Origins of the Current 
Crisis, UCLA Center for Soc. Theory and Comp. Hist. (2009), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu
/issr/cstch/papers/BrennerCrisisTodayOctober2009.pdf.
93. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND SOCIETY 8 (2015).
94. See Cobbe, supra note 6.
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Second, some readers might advance a political objection: “but what 
about the power dynamics at play?”
95
These critics do not dispute that legal 
futurism will work; rather, they bemoan that it will work altogether too well. 
The legal singularity, in eliminating legal uncertainty, would bring obvious 
efficiencies in terms of cost reduction.
96
Other things being equal, cost re-
duction is at worst neutral, and at best a clear improvement. That said, other 
things are rarely equal. Frank Pasquale is right when he observes that while 
“cost savings are a powerful argument in an era of increasing competition 
and declining state revenues,” in many cases the automation of the legal 
system “hides the externalization of cost and risk to customers, citizens, and 
business rivals.”
97
Other commentators draw attention to the fact that predic-
tive analytic tools are rolling out into an existing system of institutions and 
social relations, focusing attention on who is writing algorithms and to what 
ends.
98
There are many canaries in this coal mine already. To take just one 
example, in 2013 the State of Michigan replaced four hundred state employ-
ees with an algorithmic tool known as the Michigan Data Automated Sys-
tem (known as “MIDAS”) to process unemployment insurance claims. The 
MIDAS program flagged over 90 percent of unemployment claims as 
fraudulent, triggering an intense wave of wage and tax garnishments target-
ed at the most economically vulnerable Michiganders: those applying for 
unemployment insurance benefits.
99
The errors resulted in a predictable cas-
cade of defaults, evictions, credit impairments, bankruptcies, foreclosures, 
evictions, substance abuse problems, and family dissolutions.
The apt critical perspectives bringing attention to these and similar dys-
functions are focused on how deploying predictive analytic technologies in 
95. See Pasquale, supra note 80, at 14; cf. David Lazer et al., Computational Social 
Science, 323 SCIENCE 721 (2009).
96. See Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming 
the World, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-
artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world.
97. Pasquale, supra note 80, at 18.
98. See, e.g., SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE 
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019); RUHA BENJAMIN,
RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE (2019); VIRGINIA 
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND
PUNISH THE POOR (2018); SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW 
SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); ASTRA TAYLOR, THE PEOPLE’S PLATFORM:
TAKING BACK POWER AND CULTURE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2014); cf. BROUSSARD, supra
note 88.
99. See Stephanie Wykstra, How the Government’s Use of Algorithm Serves up False 
Fraud Charges, SALON (June 15, 2020), https://www.salon.com/2020/06/14/how-the-
governments-use-of-algorithm-serves-up-false-fraud-charges_partner; Sam Bell, Pushing 
Back Against Harmful AI, MEDIUM (Oct. 10, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/pushing-back-
against-harmful-ai-4af0265a15a2; Ryan Felton, Michigan Unemployment Agency Made 
20,000 False Fraud Accusations, GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/18/michigan-unemployment-agency-fraud-
accusations.
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the legal system can provoke effects that are largely external to the legal 
system—effects on economic security, personal liberty, privacy, and so 
forth. However, starting with the next Part, this Article explores the legal 
singularity’s internal effects on the legal system—in particular, its impact 
on law’s continued ability to claim normative force and validity through the 
rule of law principle. Stated another way, the Article inquires into the juris-
prudential ramifications of the legal singularity on the law itself—namely, 
how the legal singularity is likely to complicate the self-definition of the 
liberal legal order. It is less concerned, therefore, with the important tech-
nical complications that might (or might ultimately not) inhibit, delay, or 
prevent the singularity, or even the political complications attending the 
power dynamics that are undeniably at play.
III.  The Implications of the Legal Singularity on the 
Rule of Law
In modern societies, law enjoys a special claim to legitimacy and nor-
mative validity. Legal subjects do not mold their behavior according to the 
legal system simply because they fear the coercive power of the state.
100
In-
stead, law draws its binding force from what Jürgen Habermas—one the 
most important philosophers and social theorists of the past half century—
referred to as the “alliance that the facticity of law forms with the claim to 
legitimacy.”
101
The “facticity of law” here refers to the coercive force of du-
ly promulgated standards and rules. If a government audit reveals you have 
misstated your income tax liability, it will be difficult to evade the plain fac-
ticity of civil enforcement, and perhaps criminal punishment, by the authori-
ties. However, it is law’s special claim to legitimacy that causes many peo-
ple to consider lawbreaking simply inconceivable, irrespective of the 
contours of the coercive sanctions regime.
102
This is not to say that everyone 
molds their behavior to the shape of the law at all times,
103
particularly when 
100. For an influential empirical exploration of how law achieves normative legitimacy, 
see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d ed. 2006).
101. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 38–39 (William Rehg trans., 1996).
102. The incremental causal impact of legitimacy perception on law-abidingness contra-
dicts the classic economics models. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An 
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176 (1968) (“[T]he economists’ usual analysis of 
choice . . . assumes that a person commits an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds the 
utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities.”); Louis Kaplow 
& Lucian Bebchuk, Optimal Sanctions and Differences in Individuals’ Likelihood of Avoiding 
Detection, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217, 219 (1993) (“Individuals will choose to act when-
ever their benefit exceeds their expected sanction.”).
103. See Sanford Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1466, 1472–73 n.25 (1983) (cautioning legal profession against overstating the legiti-
mating effects of law); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK 
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no one is watching, but only that our empirically observable behavior is 
consistent with some respect for the legitimacy of law—that law’s com-
mand is different than that of a gun-toting robber (who might inflict harm 
by shooting you) or an imperious boss (who might inflict harm by depriving 
you of your means of subsistence).
The sources of law’s legitimacy and normative force are multiple, and 
this Article only focuses on one, albeit an important one: adherence to the 
rule of law principle. The rule of law can be thought of as a condition prec-
edent for any legitimate liberal social order.
104
Hence Voltaire’s exaggerated 
quip, which nevertheless reflects the basal association between liberty and 
law in the liberal imagination: “freedom means dependence on nothing oth-
er than law.”
105
And Tom Paine’s invocation of the law as a replacement for 
arbitrary monarchical will: “But where is the King of America? . . . . [I]n 
America, THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the King is 
law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there ought to be no 
other.”
106
This sentiment also figured prominently in the writings of John 
Locke, widely regarded as the father of liberalism,
107
who wrote that “the 
end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve or enlarge Free-
dom.”108
This Article focuses on the rule of law principle because when legal fu-
turists trumpet the impending elimination of legal uncertainty and the crea-
tion of a completely predictable legal system, they are drawing from themes 
that legal and political theorists have traditionally considered to be constitu-
ents of the rule of law. We have already seen how legal futurism promises 
enhanced efficiency of the market for legal services, not to mention the like-
ly benefits to economic and other social actors more generally, flowing from 
perfect knowledge of how the law will apply. This Part assumes that all this 
is true, and against that background sets forth the Article’s main claim and 
contribution: that legal futurism, in providing those apparent benefits, might 
ACT 262 (1975) (“[P]eople are not as stupid as some structuralist philosophers suppose them 
to be. They will not be mystified by the first man who puts on a wig.”).
104. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, FREEDOM’S POWER: THE TRUE FORCE OF LIBERALISM 21
(2007); Nicola Lacey, The Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm, in THE 
USES OF DISCRETION 361, 369 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992).
105. VOLTAIRE, PENSÉES SUR LE GOUVERNEMENT (1752), reprinted in OEUVRES 
COMPLÈTES DE VOLTAIRE 523, 526 (Louis Moland ed., 1883) (“La liberté consiste à ne dé-
pendre que des lois.”) (translation provided by author).
106. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 98 (Penguin Books 1976) (1776).
107. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2002).
108. LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 306. The basic idea can be 
traced even further back to ancient Rome. Cicero argued that the rule of law was the “founda-
tion of our liberty” in the following terms: “[t]he ministers of the law are the magistrates; the 
interpreters of the law are the judges; lastly, we are all servants of the laws, for the very pur-
pose of being able to be freemen.” See 2 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, THE ORATIONS OF 
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 164 (C. D. Yonge trans., 1856).
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strip some or all of the normative legitimating force the legal system enjoys 
in virtue of the rule of law principle. Put bluntly, the concern is that the le-
gal system, as we understand it, might not survive attempts to make it more 
efficient and effective.
109
Fundamentally, the argument presented here amounts to a warning 
about unintended consequences. The analysis draws force from technology 
writer Adam Greenfield’s counsel to insist on grounded, analytical rigor in 
the face of the “rhetoric of transcendence”
110
with which technologies are 
often described:
[W]hat is salient is not anything their visionary designers may have 
had in their mind in imagining them, but what states of being they 
are actually seen to enact. . . . The most misleading aspect of this 
body of rhetoric perennially resides in the gulf between technou-
topian claims about what some emergent innovation “might” or 
“could” give rise to, on the one hand, and anything that it has actu-
ally been seen to do on the other. . . . This is why I repress a shud-
der whenever someone speaks of the emancipatory or liberatory 
“potential” of some technology under discussion. To have hope and 
to nurture it in others doesn’t need to mean that we let go of ri-
gor.
111
This Part is the centerpiece of the Article, confronting the legal futurist 
rhetoric of transcendence with the possibility of serious unintended conse-
quences.
It begins in Section A with an introduction to the basic idea of the rule 
of law, explaining its association with non-arbitrariness in government, and 
identifying its two fundamental pillars: predictability and universality. Next, 
Section B situates the futurist project to achieve maximal predictability and 
eliminate legal uncertainty in the debates about legal discretion and arbitrar-
iness that generally attend the rule of law concept. It cautions that while fu-
109. The Article focuses on the rule of law, but legal futurism has potential implications 
for other core legal concepts, such as legal regulation and legal reform. Both legal regulation 
and legal reform only make sense in an environment structured by cause and effect. Legal 
regulatory interventions have intended effects, and legal reform efforts conceive of the law as 
a transformative causal agent. To the extent that legal futurism follows Anderson’s example 
and abandons efforts to understand causation in preference for correlation data alone, we 
should expect destabilization of our current modes of understanding legal regulation and legal 
reform. See supra text accompanying notes 32–35 (discussing Anderson’s remarks on the 
“end of theory”).
110. ADAM GREENFIELD, RADICAL TECHNOLOGIES: THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY LIFE
314 (2017); see also Deakin & Markou, supra note 68, at 3 (warning against the “intoxicating 
‘new government smell’ and techno-utopian visions” frequently accompanying technological 
development).
111. GREENFIELD, supra note 110, at 302–03.
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turism might solve the problem of human discretion in the law, it does not 
necessarily solve the problem of arbitrary government.
Section C and Section D take up the predictability principle and the 
universality principle, respectively. With regard to predictability, Section C 
will argue that the futurists are privileging a weak form of functional pre-
dictability over a strong form of normative predictability that is rooted in 
liberty and non-arbitrary government power. Weak-form predictability is 
unobjectionable on its own, since it facilitates efficient planning on the part 
of legal subjects. But weak-form predictability—again, on its own—has no 
intrinsic connection to the rule of law and the ideal of non-arbitrary gov-
ernment. When futurists advocate for the use of legal analytics to enhance 
legal predictability, we should beware of the threat that an inattentive and 
hurried embrace of analytics in service of (only weak-form) predictability 
will attenuate the rule of law’s connection to the deeper (strong-form) pre-
dictability principle and its commitment to non-arbitrary government.
As for universality, Section D will argue that the futurists’ rush to ban-
ish legal uncertainty and usher in a completely specified legal system also 
threatens to undermine the rule of law’s insistence that the law applies gen-
erally. The threat here is twofold. The first will resonate with readers in-
clined to critical interpretations of law: that predictive analytics software 
and code eventually embodying the legal singularity, in learning from how 
the legal system works, would institutionalize algorithmically the existing 
inequalities in the way the legal system treats its subjects, demystifying the 
ideas of legal universality and equality.
112
The second threat, on the other 
hand, strikes even deeper at the rule of law. The problem here is not that the 
legal singularity cements in place some extra-legal hierarchy; instead, the 
issue is that the basic terms of universal rights might cease to make sense in 
the face of an epistemological shift that allows the law to only see atomized 
data points where it used to see integral, individual legal subjects.
A. The Idea of the Rule of Law
The rule of law is a protean concept.
113
Legal theorist Brian Tamanaha 
clarifies the term by helpfully distinguishing between a “thick” interpreta-
tion of the rule of law and a “thin” interpretation of the concept.
114
Some 
theorists adopt a thick, capacious formulation of the rule of law that associ-
112. In this sense, the critic would say that the legal singularity is “stamped with the 
birth marks of the old [legal] system from whose womb it emerged.” KARL MARX, Critique of 
the Gotha Program, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 525, 529 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 
1978).
113. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Flor-
ida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 138–40 (2002); Paul P. Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions 
of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 467.
114. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 3, 91 
(2004).
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ates it with a broad constellation of liberal values, such as justice, transpar-
ency, rationality, due process, fairness, human and civil rights, and demo-
cratic self-government. However, others prefer a thinner conception of the 
rule of law, warning that the tendency towards a “promiscuous” interpreta-
tion of the term to include a laundry list of other ideals would deprive it of 
any useful function.
115
Political philosopher Henry Richardson has written about the relation-
ship between the rule of law and the deeper reservoir of liberal values. He
espouses a thin, but still substantial, conception of the rule of law, while al-
so registering the difficulty of completely severing any connection between 
the rule of law, on the one hand, and legitimacy, popular democracy, and 
freedom, on the other:
On certain conceptions of legality, the rule of law and democracy 
are inherently connected, perhaps because legality is thought of as 
intimately tied to legitimacy, and legitimacy, in turn, depends on 
democracy. As I will be using the term “rule of law,” however, the 
question of the relation between the rule of law and democracy is 
more open than this. While the legitimacy of laws does depend on 
democracy, there is a thinner understanding of the rule of law that 
does not carry with it all of the commitment of legitimate legality. 
This narrower, traditional interpretation of the rule of law may be 
summed up under three headings: generality, predictability, and 
regular process.
116
Even if the rule of law lacks the deep normative power of democratic self-
government, it nevertheless “bears an obvious connection with the ideal of 
freedom and the way it puts all lawmaking under a burden of legitima-
tion.”
117
After all, a “basic respect for their freedom demands that citizens be 
able to discern [the laws], that they be able to take them into account in 
planning their activities, and that they not be imposed arbitrarily.”
118
Thus, we see that, for Richardson, even the thin conception puts law-
making under a burden of legitimation to protect against arbitrary govern-
ment power. This Article largely follows Richardson’s lead in opting for a 
modest conception of the rule of law, while still acknowledging the rule of 
law’s connections to other liberal values. It will focus in particular on the 
115. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 211 
(1979). John Rawls also inclined towards this narrow formulation. For Rawls, the rule of law 
is only one of many settings that give institutional form to the deeper principle of equal liber-
ty, the first (in both sequence and importance) of his two foundational principles of a just so-
ciety. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 52–53, 179–80 (rev. ed. 1999).
116. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT 
THE ENDS OF POLICY 216 (2002).
117. Id. at 217.
118. Id.
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two core pillars of the rule of law: predictability and universality.119 These 
two principles reciprocally reinforce one another
120
in their shared project to 
limit arbitrary government impingement of freedom.
121
In summary, the rule of law contributes a significant degree of legitima-
cy to modern liberal government though its commitment to non-arbitrary 
government, but that contribution is specific to the rule of law and is analyt-
ically distinct from contributions made by other liberal values such as dem-
ocratic self-government, due process, civil and political rights, and popular 
sovereignty. Accordingly, as discussed in greater detail later, if the legal 
singularity ends up weakening the rule of law, the legal system would lose 
the legitimating effects the rule of law provides, requiring it to lean on those 
other sources of legitimation for support.
122
An opportunity thus might open 
up for a joint project to reconceptualize how law becomes legitimate by 
119. These core pillars can be traced back at least as far as early republican Rome, 
which published a legal code in the Fifth Century B.C.E.—the so-called “Twelve Tables”—
that was both predictable, because it was published and accessible to all, and universal, be-
cause it included the prohibition privilegia ne irroganto—that is, “no laws shall be passed 
affecting an individual only.” THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND JUSTINIAN, THE TWELVE 
TABLES 588 (T. Lambert Mears ed., 1882).
120. For instance, a law that is general but not predictable—as with, for example, the 
infamous Nazi statute providing for punishment of anyone who “performs an act . . . which is 
deserving of punishment according to the healthy racial feeling”—cannot be consonant with 
the rule of law. See FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF 
NATIONAL SOCIALISM: 1933–1944 441–42 (2d ed. 1944). Conversely, a law that is predicta-
ble but not general—as with, for example, a law barring from public office any person who 
has appeared on the membership rolls of a certain disfavored political organization—would 
suffer a similar fate. Frequently, both principles animate core liberal-constitutional rules, such 
as the prohibition on retroactive legislation. Straightforwardly, the prohibition fosters law’s
predictability. But it also promotes law’s universality, inasmuch as a retroactive law is objec-
tionable in part because it applies exclusively to a definite subset of the citizenry—those who 
have committed the conduct the new law prohibits.
121. See, e.g., Jeffrey Jowell, The Rule of Law, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 13, 
21–22 (Jeffrey Jowell et al. eds., 8th ed. 2015) (listing “certainty” and “equality” as core re-
quirements of the rule of law); Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 19 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
DRL] (referring to “equality” but in substance meaning what is intended by “universality” and
“generality” here); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 210 (1969) (emphasizing “the 
twin principles of generality and of faithful adherence by government to its own declared 
rules”).
122. A reader inclined to accept capacious and “promiscuous” definitions of the rule of 
law will read this statement as a tautology. If the legal system’s legitimacy depends on the 
rule of law, which includes not just predictability and universality but also the kitchen sink, 
then of course the kitchen sink becomes more important as predictability and universality dis-
appear. However, such a reader will also likely fail to take account of the dynamic discussed 
here concerning the narrower definition of the rule of law.
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joining liberals eager to replace the rule of law and radical lawyers who 
have always been keen to scrap the artifact altogether.
123
B. A Prefatory Note on the Rule of Law’s Treatment of Arbitrariness 
and Discretion
Thus far, the discussion has linked the rule of law to the problem of ar-
bitrary government power but has omitted any mention of the problem of 
legal discretion. This omission is perhaps surprising, since A.V. Dicey, the 
first legal theorist to formally elaborate the notion of the rule of law, posited 
a fundamental antithesis between the rule of law and discretion.
124
Accord-
ing to Dicey, where there was discretion, there was room for arbitrariness, 
and the rule of law was not present.
We have seen how the futurists claim that the legal singularity will 
eliminate the discretion problem from the legal system altogether. Indeed, 
many proponents of predictive legal analytics advocate for these new tech-
nologies by touting their potential to minimize discretion on the part of 
lawmakers and lawyers.
125
When framing the issue in terms of discretion, 
the futurists sometimes use the familiar standards-rules dichotomy, touting 
their newfound abilities to “turn standards into rules” and thereby eliminate 
the quantum of brute discretion that the former inevitably entail.
126
A legal 
system without discretion used to be, at most, a formalistic thought experi-
ment.
127
Now, at least for the futurists, it is a commonplace.
In a world before predictive legal analytics (let alone something like the 
legal singularity), it made sense for lawyers to collapse the notions of dis-
123. Cf. Daniel H. Cole, “An Unqualified Human Good”: E.P. Thompson and the Rule 
of Law, 28 J.L. & SOC’Y 177 (2001) (promoting efforts “to marry radical and liberal theories 
of law”).
124. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
110 (8th ed. 1915) (“[W]herever there is discretion there is room for arbitrariness, and that in 
a republic no less than under a monarchy discretionary authority on the part of the government 
must mean insecurity for legal freedom on the part of its subjects.”); see also TAMANAHA,
supra note 114, at 67.
125. See David Engstrom & Jonah Gelbach, Legal Tech, Civil Procedure, and the Fu-
ture of Adversarialism, 169 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 
7), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/SSRN-id3551589-Legal-Tech-Civil-
Procedure-and-the-Future-of-Adversarialism.pdf (describing the futurists).
126. See, e.g., Benjamin Alarie, Turning Standards into Rules—Part 5: Weighing the 
Factors in Capital Gains vs. Ordinary Income Decisions, BLOOMBERG DAILY TAX REP. (Jan. 
14, 2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/insight-turning-standards-into-
rules-part-5-weighing-the-factors-in-capital-gains-vs-ordinary-income-decisions.
127. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675–76 (1975) (discussing the “transmission belt” theory of adminis-
trative law, according to which the agency automatically implements legislative directives 
with no room for discretion); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q.
197, 214 (1887) (analogizing implementing authorities to a cook to whom the housekeeper 
has delegated the task of “manag[ing] the fires and the ovens”).
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cretion and arbitrariness.
128
As noted earlier, Dicey believed that discretion 
on the part of government officials was necessarily arbitrariness.129 For him, 
arbitrariness was a human problem; it was always possible to identify the 
government actors who were acting arbitrarily. The paradigm of arbitrary 
government was monarchy, which inevitably entailed, following Tom 
Paine, “arbitrary power in an individual person; in the exercise of which, 
himself, and not the res publica, is the object.”
130
This sense is captured by 
the rule of law maxim that we are subject to a “government of laws, and not 
of men.”
131
Arbitrariness is a difficult concept to specify in the abstract, although 
any conception of non-arbitrary power would seem to require that laws 
serve the welfare, or otherwise respond to the preferences, of the public.
132
Paine again is relevant: the kernel of non-arbitrariness is that the laws are 
directed in the interest of the res publica, and not the king—or anyone, or 
anything, else.
133
And so too is Locke, who wrote that non-arbitrary legisla-
tion was always “designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the 
People.”134 Moreover, the liberal tradition requires not only that government 
action be motivated by a conception of the public welfare, but also that the 
motivations could credibly claim the consent of those to whom the action 
applies.
135
To be sure, political pluralists, civic republicans, deliberative 
democrats, and others surely will disagree about the proper institutional ma-
trix for producing and enforcing laws, but they all can agree, pace public 
choice theorists and autocrats, that laws are arbitrary if they do not bear a 
firm relation to the public’s interest and a credible claim to the public’s con-
sent.
On the other hand, if the software and code embodying the legal singu-
larity abstracts the legal system away from human discretion altogether, is 
128. To be sure, a more modern view of governmental discretion does not see discretion 
as inimical to the rule of law, but rather seeks to require discretion to be exercised within the 
scope of legality. See Jowell, supra note 121, at 20–21.
129. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
130. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN (1791), reprinted in THE COLLECTED WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS PAINE 243, 369 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945) (emphasis added).
131. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
132. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT
56 (1997); see also RAZ, supra note 115, at 220 (“Since it is wrong to use public powers for 
private ends, any such use is in itself an instance of arbitrary use of power.”).
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
134. LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 363; see also JOHN LOCKE, 
A Third Letter for Toleration, in LOCKE ON TOLERATION 123, 142 (Richard Vernon ed., 
2010) (“The power that is in the civil sovereign is the force of all the subjects of the com-
monwealth, which supposing it sufficient for other ends, than the preserving the members of 
the commonwealth in peace from injury and violence: yet if those who gave him that power, 
limited the application of it to that sole end, no opinion of any other benefits attainable by it 
can authorize him to use it otherwise.”).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 143–145.
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there still an arbitrariness problem for the rule of law to fix? While reducing 
human discretion seems a necessary part of any legal system administered 
by persons, does its importance fade, if not disappear altogether, in a legal 
system governed by algorithms? Is human discretion a problem in and of 
itself that, if counteracted, simply disappears? Or is it an epiphenomenal 
sign of a deeper problem that legal subjects have not consented to the design 
of the rules that bind them—that the legal rules do not depend for the exist-
ence on the welfare of the res publica? And if that is the case, wouldn’t the 
legal singularity set this arbitrary machine on autopilot?
In other words, if the futurist response to the discretion problem is to 
imagine an algorithmic function that abstracts away from the human ele-
ment of the law, have we solved the problem, or have we created an equally 
vexing, if not bigger, problem? Our answers to these questions will depend 
on how we conceptualize arbitrariness as a problem that the rule of law 
counteracts. Whether or not we remain in the world of Paine and Dicey, 
where the threat of arbitrary rule takes the form of a disconnect between the 
human government actors and the res publica, or whether we should update 
our concepts to accommodate the possibility of arbitrary algorithmic rule, is 
a question that runs throughout the Article.
How we view this relationship between discretion and arbitrariness will 
determine how concerned we should be about the potential normative rami-
fications of the algorithmizing of the legal system. Most obviously, those 
inclined to conceive of arbitrariness as a human problem will be disinclined 
to worry about these implications. For them, eliminating arbitrary human 
discretion is an unalloyed good. Conversely, those who consider the real 
problem with arbitrariness to be the lack of connection between the res pub-
lica and the laws that govern it will view the legal singularity with appre-
hension, if not horror. They will worry that the futurist emphasis on the 
elimination of discretion might disguise an algorithmic institutionalization 
of arbitrariness in the form of an “algocratic” legal system disconnected 
from legal subjects. For them, a de-personalized arbitrariness is just as much 
to fear as a personalized human arbitrariness. In the end, the question is 
whether the rules (and algorithms) that govern have been promulgated in 
their interest, with their consent, and perhaps even with their input.
If we do believe the problem is arbitrariness and not human discretion 
as such, then we should be concerned about the legal singularity’s effects on 
the rule of law. After all, the purpose of the rule of law is to protect against 
arbitrary government. The following two Sections suggest that the legal sin-
gularity would undermine the rule of law by abandoning the commitment to 
universality and privileging a thin, weak conception of predictability com-
mitted to efficiency over a more robust, strong conception committed to 
non-arbitrariness.
This discussion concerning the possibility of replacing human discre-
tion with algorithmic certainty allows us to foreground the Article’s main 
Fall 2020] “Legal Singularity” 131
argument: namely, that solving the problem of human discretion by enhanc-
ing the predictability of the legal system has the twofold consequence of (1) 
creating a new problem in the form of possibly arbitrary rule by algorithm 
and (2) sapping the rule of law construct of the normative force to combat 
that new problem. In the process, it also brings us back to the ambiguous 
relationship between the rule of law and self-government, discussed earlier 
in reference to Richardson’s formulation of the rule of law.
136
For those who 
remain troubled by the prospect of a non-democratic rule of algorithmic 
law, notwithstanding its elimination of the human discretion problem, the 
legal singularity would seem to heighten the need to look for forms of legit-
imation beyond the rule of law.
137
C. The Legal Singularity and the Predictability Principle
A basic tenet of any formulation of the liberal rule of law is that a legal 
system must be roughly predictable. This is the rule of law’s “predictability 
principle.” The predictability principle is taken up first here because it is the 
raison d’être of the entire predictive legal analytics program.138 The central 
promise of the legal futurists is that predictive legal analytics will make the 
legal system more predictable, finally solving the twin problems of uncer-
tainty and discretion that plague legal systems.
The predictability principle requires that a liberal legal system must 
provide its legal subjects with guidance about how the law applies to them 
and their affairs. In so doing, measures that foster predictability can limit the 
ability of governments to exercise discretion arbitrarily. Moreover, when 
law is predictable, legal subjects are able to form expectations and plan their 
future affairs, as well as make credible and binding commitments to one an-
other. Nevertheless, the predictability principle’s virtue of promoting non-
arbitrariness should be distinguished from its virtue of promoting expecta-
tions.
1. Strong-Form Predictability
The idea that there exists an association between the rule of law and 
predictability traces its origins to the birth of liberalism as a political philos-
ophy. The cornerstone of political liberalism is the social contract idea that 
the government’s authority derives from the consent of the governed.
139
For 
136. See supra Section III.A.
137. See supra text accompanying note 122.
138. See supra Section II.C.
139. Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 140 
(1987) (“The thesis that I want to say is fundamentally liberal is this: a social and political 
order is illegitimate unless it is rooted in the consent of all those who have to live under it; the 
consent or agreement of these people is a condition of its being morally permissible to en-
force.”); see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 224 (1993) (noting that “the principle 
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Locke, the social contract was the embodiment of the consent of the gov-
erned to form a polity with authority to promulgate legislative decrees. Nev-
ertheless, that consent did not extend to unjust, unnatural legislation that 
unduly limited liberty.
140
Most relevant for present purposes, Locke believed 
further that predictability was a necessary condition of any such legislation: 
“whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is 
bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to 
the people, and not by extemporary decrees.”
141
But why did the threat of unpredictable and “extemporary” legal de-
crees so offend Locke? And why did he maintain that the laws must be 
“known to the people”? To answer these questions, it is helpful to distin-
guish two perspectives on the importance of a predictable legal system. 
First, a strong form of the predictability principle maintains that the law 
must be predictable to limit the arbitrary exercise of government power. Be-
cause the core idea of liberalism is that people consent to surrendering their 
natural freedoms only for the purpose of protecting their freedoms in greater 
measure, we can think of the strong form as a cornerstone of the entire lib-
eral project.
142
Locke himself espoused this strong-form theory, believing 
that predictable rules would circumscribe arbitrary power:
freedom of men under government is, to have a standing rule to live 
by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legisla-
tive power erected in it; a liberty to follow my own will in all 
things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the 
inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man.
143
For Locke, all collective power exists only for the good of the society, and 
as such its exercise “ought not to be arbitrary and at [the] pleasure” of the 
rulers. Predictable laws not only let people know their duties and their liber-
ties, they also ensure that the rulers avoid the temptation to employ collec-
tive power in service of purposes of which the public would not approve:
of political legitimacy” requires that the “basic structure [of government] and its policies are 
to be justifiable to all citizens”); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 33 (1991) 
(“The task of discovering the conditions of [political] legitimacy is traditionally conceived as 
that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone who is required to live under 
it.”).
140. See LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 358–59.
141. Id. at 353.
142. See id. at 306, 357; PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 48–49 (2018); 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. 2 (Fr. 1789) (“The aim of all 
political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.”); 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (declaring that “Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed” in order 
to “secure . . . rights”).
143. LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 284.
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[A]ll the power the government has, being only for the good of the 
society . . . it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated 
laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and se-
cure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their 
bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, 
to employ it to such purposes, and by such measures, as they would 
not have known, and own not willingly.144
In this manner, law’s predictability is a procedural transparency device that 
restricts the government from enacting arbitrary legal rules to which the pol-
ity did not and would not consent. To appreciate the importance of predicta-
bility of a legal system, it is necessary to consider the citizenry’s ongoing 
consent to, and opinion of, that system. It is not just that the laws must be 
discernible; they also must be comprehensible, intelligible, and amenable, at 
least in theory, to contestation. The authorities must “own willingly” their 
exercise of governmental authority, making it possible for the citizenry to 
demand reasoned explanations for incursions in their otherwise natural 
rights to liberty and autonomy.
Predictability, then, is in practice a precondition of the people’s in-
formed consent—which, in turn, is the touchstone of a free and liberal polity 
not subject to arbitrary rule.
145
Moreover, the reserve power of the people to 
revolt, so familiar to the experience of American political theory, lurks in 
the shadows as a vagrant threat that disciplines the government in the exer-
cise of its delegated powers.
146
This potential revolutionary subject is always 
on the other side of the strong-form predictability coin. Even if in the form 
of this negative potential political energy, predictability and notice ensure 
that the citizenry is at least a partial author of the laws that apply to them. 
Hence, some element of democratic process, sufficient to underwrite a no-
tion of consent, is responsible for the normative force of law in the Lockean 
conception. In contemporary political and social theory, Habermas express-
es this idea perhaps most clearly, noting that a legal system providing for 
liberal individual rights (of property, of expression, etc.) requires meaning-
ful recourse of the citizens to some democratic process that can serve as the 
legitimate basis for their consent.
147
John Rawls also invokes the Lockean, strong-form association of legal 
predictability with liberty and non-arbitrary government power, arguing that 
the purpose of law is to “organize social behavior by providing a basis for 
144. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
145. See supra note 139.
146. See RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCKE’S TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 484 (1986); LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8,
at 406–28 (concluding chapter of Second Treatise devoted to “dissolution of the govern-
ment”).
147. See HABERMAS, supra note 101, at 32–33.
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legitimate expectations,”
148
so as to make the “boundaries of our liberty”
149
more certain. A predictable legal order, therefore, protects our liberties from 
arbitrary intrusions and can be distinguished from, as Rawls would put it, a 
“collection of particular orders designed to advance the interests of a dicta-
tor or the ideals of a benevolent despot.”
150
When we say we are a “govern-
ment of laws, and not of men,”
151
or when we, following Madison, empha-
size the urgency of the need to oblige the government to “control itself,”
152
we are invoking this strong form of the predictability principle and its 




In contrast to the strong-form conception of predictability as an antidote 
to arbitrariness in government, a weak form of the predictability principle 
maintains simply that the law must be predictable so that legal subjects can 
form expectations about how the law will affect them. For weak-form theo-
rists, the rule of law requires laws to be predictable so that law absorbs un-
certainty and guarantees order.
154
Thomas Hobbes is the classical expositor of the weak form. Writing a 
half-century before Locke published his Second Treatise, Hobbes ap-
proached the issue of predictability from the perspective of social order. He 
wrote that governments could only ensure peace—or, in his words, “prevent 
brawls from arising”—if they:
make some common rules for all men, and to declare them public-
ly, by which every man may know what may be called his, what 
another’s, what just, what unjust, what honest, what dishonest, what 
148. RAWLS, supra note 115, at 209.
149. Id. at 210.
150. Id. at 208.
151. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 372 (James Madison) (Cynthia Johnson ed., 2004).
153. Similarly, American constitutional law privileges strong-form predictability over 
weak-form predictability. For instance, the Due Process Clause imposes no meaningful con-
straints on the legislature’s freedom to unravel expectations (and thereby violate the weak-
form predictability principle). Instead, the strong-form principle emerges as the only limiting 
principle, restricting the legislature from acting in an “arbitrary” manner. See Usery v. Turner 
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (“It is by now well established that legislative acts 
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of 
constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to es-
tablish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.”).
154. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 99 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) 
(noting how legal positivists, as weak-form theorists, see law’s fundamental function as uncer-
tainty absorption).
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good, what evil, that is summarily, what is to be done, what to be 
avoided in our common course of life.
155
In Hobbesian government, legal subjects promise obedience to an absolute 
authority in order to preserve themselves from the violent uncertainty and 
chaos of nature. The absolute sovereign then commands with the force of 
law and legal subjects respond with mechanistic automaticity.
156
The consent to obey, the formulation of legal rules, and the public dec-
laration of those rules all serve the purpose of maintaining a government 
that is effective at guaranteeing social order. In this way, Hobbesian rule of 
law, buttressed by predictability, provides a sort of equilibrium manual for 
society.
157
Whereas Locke’s overriding preoccupation was securing natural 
rights of liberty and limiting arbitrariness on the part of a regrettably neces-
sary government, Hobbes’s focus was on the social stability that only an ab-
solute sovereign could secure.
158
The legal-political philosophy of Friedrich Hayek is a modern variation 
on the weak-form theme, and it illustrates the danger of equating the rule of 
law with mere weak-form predictability.
159
Hayek echoes Hobbes when he 
writes that “government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and an-
nounced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair cer-
tainty how the authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances, 
and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.”
160
A
closer look reveals that Hayek’s conception of the role of law in the emer-
155. THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE: OR, THE CITIZEN 74 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed., Ap-
pleton-Century-Crofts 1949) (1647) (emphasis added).
156. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 389 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1996) (1651).
157. José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski, Introduction, in DRL, supra note 121, at 
1, 5.
158. While Hobbes believed that social stability depended entirely on a sovereign state 
with the power to make binding decisions, at times he acknowledges, without fully developing 
his analysis, that natural law also requires spheres of liberty into which the state cannot in-
trude. See, e.g., HOBBES, supra note 156, at 151 (“If the sovereign command a man (though 
justly condemned[]) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; 
or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot 
live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.”); HOBBES, supra note 155, at 157 (“That 
which is prohibited by the divine law, cannot be permitted by the civil, neither can that which 
is commanded by the divine law, be prohibited by the civil.”).
159. At first blush, Hayek might be thought of as an inverted Hobbesian. After all, 
Hobbes famously viewed the natural state of human relations to be characterized by violence 
and discord; the state and political life saved mankind from itself. Hayek, in sharp contrast, 
viewed these institutions with hostility, associating them with central planning and Stalinism. 
In his estimation, human societies, left to their own devices, evolve towards forms of coopera-
tion for mutual advantage; social order therefore emerges from voluntary, cooperative interac-
tions. See Eric Mack, Friedrich Hayek on the Nature of Social Order and Law, in POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AUTHORS AND ARGUMENTS 129, 138–40 (Cathe-
rine H. Zuckert ed., 2011).
160. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (emphasis added).
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gent social order is peculiar, particularly in the way he distinguishes the rule 
of law from the rule of legislation. For him, law is historically and concep-
tually antecedent to the state and its legislative power.
161
Law consists of the 
set of norms and rules that happen to facilitate the types of coordination that 
emerge among members of society. Hence the rule of law is present where 
the key constitutive fibers holding a society together—which, again, are an-
alytically distinct from and, in fact, prior to, any legislation or judicial pro-
nouncement—are respected and enforced.
For Hayek, the cooperative institutions that hold society together are 
those, like rules of property and contract, that facilitate mutual economic 
advantage. Consequently, Hayek’s conception of the rule of law is a thin 
one, shrunken to the idea that government would not interfere with individ-
ual economic freedoms.162 Hayek is transparent about this: according to him, 
arbitrariness in the exercise of government power consists only of interfer-
ence with the market pricing mechanism.
163
The resulting economic freedom 
produces a spontaneous social order, which he referred to as catallaxy,
“brought about by the mutual adjustment of many individual economies in a 
market.”
164
Social, collective order thus emerges out of a multiplicity of in-
dividual egoists.
165
And a minimalist rule of law principle guarantees the 
basic framework within which markets can aggregate individual knowledge 
to produce this order.
166
Here, Hayek followed his mentor Ludwig von Mis-
es, who believed that social order would emerge not from central planning 
but from a “consumers’ democracy” in which price signals, produced in 
conditions of competition, would align productive activity to satisfy human 
desires.
167
In this way, these Austrian School authors planted the intellectual 
161. Mack, supra note 159, at 138.
162. In this respect, it is doubly thin: not only is it purely negative and not positive, but it 
is also concerned exclusively with market transactions and not with rights of political partici-
pation or any non-market intrusions of coercive power.
163. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 227–28 (1960) (defin-
ing as “arbitrary” government power any action that interferes with the market price mecha-
nism); DUNCAN K. FOLEY, ADAM’S FALLACY: A GUIDE TO ECONOMIC THEOLOGY 208 
(2006) (characterizing as “rather implausible” Hayek’s claim that “government intervention to 
stabilize and regulate the capitalist economy represented as much a threat to the freedom and 
dignity of the individual as totalitarian dictatorships did”).
164. 2 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT 
OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 108–09 (1982).
165. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, IN DEFENCE OF SOCIOLOGY: ESSAYS, INTERPRETATIONS 
& REJOINDERS 243 (1996).
166. See CHRISTINE SYPNOWICH, THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIST LAW 62–63 (1990).
167. See LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 21, 443 (Jacques Kahane trans., Yale Univ. Press 1951) (1922). It bears mention 
that von Mises, like Hayek, ultimately embraced fascism, noting in the aftermath of the Italian 
fascists marching on Rome, that “[i]t cannot be denied that Fascism and similar movements 
aiming at the establishment of dictatorships are full of the best intentions and that their inter-
vention has, for the moment, saved European civilization. The merit that Fascism has thereby 
won for itself will live on eternally in history.” LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM: IN THE 
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and ideological roots of neoliberalism
168
as a reactionary outgrowth of clas-
sical liberalism arising in a particular historical context: as a response to the 
perceived threats of central planning (as with most versions of socialism) 
and state intervention (as with post-war Keynesian economic policy), seek-
ing to preserve a particular notion of economic freedom.
169
This reductionist position, which entails a thin conceptualization of 
freedom and non-arbitrary government, is what made it possible for Hayek 
to applaud Augusto Pinochet of Chile as a “liberal dictator”
170
and to affirm 
that “you can have economic freedom without political freedom, but you 
cannot have political freedom without economic freedom.”
171
Milton Fried-
CLASSICAL TRADITION 51 (Ralph Raico trans., 3d ed. 1985). Resolving the question whether 
the relationship between Austrian political-economic theory and fascism was one of conven-
ience resulting from their mutual opposition to socialism, or whether there is a historical, im-
manent relationship between late liberalism and fascism, need not be taken up here. For those 
interested in exploring the latter possibility, see MITCHELL & FAZI, supra note 41, at 98–106; 
HERBERT MARCUSE, The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian View of the State, in
NEGATIONS: ESSAYS IN CRITICAL THEORY 1, 5–19 (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1968); KARL 
POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR 
TIME 257–58 (1944).
168. Neoliberalism is a contested term, but it is best to conceive of the intellectual roots 
of neoliberalism (including, most prominently, von Mises, Hayek, and Milton Friedman) as a 
subset of modern heirs of the liberal tradition, invoking liberal ideas of freedom to rebut eco-
nomic arguments in favor of intervention, regulation, and socialism in the context of post-war 
industrial capitalism. Neoliberal politics and institutions, on the other hand, frequently violat-
ed these roots in the most flagrant manner. See MITCHELL & FAZI, supra note 41, at 106 (ar-
guing that “not only does neoliberal economic policy require the presence of a strong state, 
but it requires the presence of an authoritarian state”). While outside the scope of the analysis 
here, taking care to distinguish the theory of neoliberalism from the actual practice of neolib-
eral government underscores the flexibility of the former (including its commitment to only 
weak-form predictability and its concomitant minimization of the traditional liberal notion of 
consent) to accommodate the latter.
169. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, ASSEMBLY 155–56 (2017); DAVID 
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 20–21 (2005).
170. See John M. Geddes, New Vogue for Critic of Keynes, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1979, at 
D1, D7 (interviewing Hayek). A possible contemporary example of the liberal dictatorship 
model is Jair Bolsonaro’s Brazil, where a government with autocratic inclinations embraces 
both the legacy of military dictatorship and putatively liberal economic policies. See Anthony 
Boadle, Chile’s ‘Chicago Boys,’ a Model for Brazil Now?, REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-chicagoboys-explainer/explainer-chiles-
chicago-boys-a-model-for-brazil-now-idUSKCN1OY1OU.
171. Geddes, supra note 170, at D7; see also George Monbiot, Neoliberalism: The Ide-
ology at the Root of All Our Problems, GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-
monbiot (quoting Hayek as having said “my personal preference leans toward a liberal dicta-
torship rather than toward a democratic government devoid of liberalism”); EDMUND 
FAWCETT, LIBERALISM: THE LIFE OF AN IDEA 324–25 (2d ed. 2018) (“Hayek stressed that 
liberalism neither required nor opposed democracy. Liberalism’s foes were totalitarianism and 
central control of life. Democracy’s foe was autocracy, which was compatible with liberty.”); 
Neil Davidson & Richard Saull, Neoliberalism and the Far-Right: A Contradictory Embrace, 
43 CRITICAL SOCIO. 707, 716 (2017) (“Neoliberalism was always suspicious of democracy 
and, above all, of interventions by institutions reflecting the collective will of democratic citi-
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man, the standard bearer for the other tradition of neoliberal economic 
thought repudiating mid-twentieth century Keynesian compromises (the 
Chicago School), largely shared this perspective.
172
Having defined arbitrary government in terms of interference with mar-
ket prices, Hayekian legal theory confronts a problem: its weak conceptual-
ization of the predictability principle leaves ample room for what most ob-
servers would characterize as arbitrary, even dictatorial, government. Its 
spirit is legalistic and formalist more than authentically liberal, recalling de 
Tocqueville’s famous description of lawyers as primarily concerned with 
orderliness: “although [lawyers] value liberty, they generally rate legality as 
far more precious; they are less afraid of tyranny than of arbitrariness, and 
provided that it is the lawgiver himself who is responsible for taking away 
men’s independence, they are more or less content.”
173
The rule of law be-
comes “law and order,” which is revealed to entail a twofold connotation: 
on the one hand, as a catallactic economic-social order that emerges from a 
shrunken, formalized system of predictable law; and on the other hand, its 
common understanding as a message of indifference about coercive police 
states, like Chile’s dictatorship, provided that they purport to guarantee eco-
nomic freedoms.
174
Another weak-form theorist, the legal positivist Joseph Raz, helps us to 
understand why the Hayekian rule of law confronts this problem. Raz con-
siders the rule of law to refer to the attribute of a legal system that makes it 
“capable of guiding the behavior of its subjects.”
175
In other words, the rule 
of law is present whenever the law is predictable, full stop. Raz, while ulti-
mately espousing a weak-form version of the predictability principle, 
zens on the operation of the market economy.”); FREDRIC JAMESON, AN AMERICAN UTOPIA:
DUAL POWER AND THE UNIVERSAL ARMY 42 (2016) (observing that for Hayek, “capitalism 
was incompatible with genuine mass democracy”); HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 169, at 156 
(“One standard neoliberal tactic is to . . . de-democratize the state.”).
172. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 10 (1962) (“History suggests only 
that capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom. Clearly it is not a sufficient con-
dition. . . . It is therefore clearly possible to have economic arrangements that are fundamen-
tally capitalist and political arrangements that are not free.”).
173. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 266 (J.P. Mayer ed., George 
Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Company 1969) (1835).
174. Foucault makes this point in his late lectures on neoliberalism. MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1978–1979 174 (Michel 
Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell trans., 2008).
175. RAZ, supra note 115, at 214. In a later essay, Raz moves in the direction of a 
strong-form formulation. See JOSEPH RAZ, The Politics of the Rule of Law, in ETHICS IN THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 370, 377 (1995) (“In cur-
tailing arbitrary power, and in securing a well-ordered society, subject to accountable, princi-
pled government, lies the value of the rule of law.”). Nevertheless, he is careful to specify that 
the essay’s argument is confined to the narrow context of Britain, or jurisdictions with politi-
cal-legal cultures. See id. at 370. He acknowledges that such a specification in effect presup-
poses democratic participation in government, due process during bureaucratic encounters, 
and a strong and independent judiciary. See id. at 376–77.
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acknowledges upfront that the rule of law is no guarantee of non-arbitrary 
governmental force and power. Whereas Hayek advocated for a narrow 
form of legal predictability as an instrument in service of the objective of a 
thoroughly privatized society, Raz neither embraces nor rejects predictabil-
ity and the rule of law as such. While law’s predictability might occasion a 
general tendency to non-arbitrariness on the part of governmental officials, 
Raz believes that “many forms of arbitrary rule are compatible with the rule 
of law.”
176
Here, he is imagining a government akin to Hayek’s “liberal dic-
tatorship”—a regime in which the ruler promulgates rules “based on whim 
or self-interest, etc., without offending against the rule of law.”
177
A predict-
able legal system largely in conformity with the rule of law might, holding 
all else equal, increase freedom and dignity, but, as Raz points out, “other 
things are rarely equal.”
178
Instead, Raz describes the rule of law as an “instrumental” and “subser-
vient” idea with “no more than prima facie force.”
179
In this respect, it is 
comparable to a sharp knife. The knife’s sharpness is neither inherently 
good nor evil, and can be used with equal effectiveness to slice a mango or 
deprive a robbery victim of his wallet. Raz continues in terms that echo 
Hobbes’s emphasis on the importance of the rule of law as a guarantee of 
social order:
Regarding the rule of law as the inherent or specific virtue of law is 
a result of an instrumental conception of law. The law is not just a 
fact of life. It is a form of social organization which should be used 
properly and for the proper ends. It is a tool in the hands of men 
differing from many others in being versatile and capable of being 
used for a large variety of proper purposes . . . . Like other instru-
ments, the law has a specific virtue which is morally neutral in be-
ing neutral as to the end to which the instrument is put. It is the vir-
tue of efficiency; the virtue of the instrument as an instrument.
180
We could make law as predictable as possible, but Raz expects that we 
should frequently prefer a “lesser degree of conformity” to the rule of law in 
order to use the legal system to promote other social goals. Indeed, he con-
tinues, “sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the rule of law may 
make the law barren and empty.”
181
In other words, the rule of law is not a 
maximand; even if we could maximally promote predictability by hyposta-
tizing the law as it presently exists, we would do so at the cost of depriving 
the law of its organic ability to evolve and preserve its claim to the consent 
176. RAZ, supra note 115, at 219.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 228.
179. Id. at 226–29.
180. Id. at 226.
181. Id. at 228–29.
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of the governed that mattered so much to Locke. Raz might have added that 
the law might, in the process, compromise its claim to normative validity. 
So, whereas Hayek embraces weak-form predictability despite its possible 
side effects, Raz warns against those side effects and the danger of a uni-
tary, uncritical pursuit of predictability in the first place.
182
Thus, we can individuate two related, but distinct, animating perspec-
tives concerning predictability and the rule of law.
183
Simplifying only 
somewhat, strong-form theorists pose the question “does the legal system 
protect against arbitrary government power and thereby promote liberty?”
while weak-form theorists ask “does the legal system promote and maintain 
social order by guaranteeing expectations?” Both perspectives assign a vi-
tal role to the predictability of law in answering these related, but ultimately 
distinct, questions. The strong-form perspective is oriented toward liberty 
and counteracts the exercise of arbitrary governmental power, whereas the 
weak-form perspective sees law in instrumental terms and has an ambiguous 
182. Other important weak-form theorists include Raz’s mentor Herbert Hart and Justice 
Antonin Scalia. Each emphasized law’s ability to set expectations and provide for certainty 
concerning the conflicts and disputes that inevitably arise in modern life. Hart conceived of 
his “rule of recognition” concept, the linchpin of his entire positivist jurisprudence, as a “rem-
edy for the uncertainty” pervading modern legal systems, comprised as they were of indeter-
minate and potentially conflicting rules. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94 (2d ed. 
1994). Rules of recognition were “procedures for settling doubts”; indeed, they were the 
“proper way of disposing of doubts.” Id. at 92–95. Justice Scalia, a more contemporary and 
applied standard-bearer of this positivist tradition, advocated for his textualist method of statu-
tory interpretation on the grounds that it provided for predictability and thereby promoted the 
rule of law: “textualism will provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predicta-
bility and greater respect for the rule of law.” ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxviii–xxix (2012); see also Antonin 
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (“[U]ncertainty 
has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law.”).
183. The distinction between the strong form and the weak form of the predictability 
principle is a conceptual tool rather than an empirical observation. While their differences as 
ideal types are apparent, the weak form and the strong form frequently coexist in a wide array 
of legal regimes, and the strong-form usually (but not necessarily) includes the weak-form.
The below passage from Locke’s Second Treatise captures the two sides of the predictability 
coin:
[A]ll the power the Government has, being only for the good of the society, as it 
ought not to be Arbitrary and at Pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established 
and promulgated Laws: that both the People may know their Duty, and be safe and 
secure within the limits of the Law, and the Rulers too kept within their bounds, 
and not to be tempted, by the Power they have in their hands, to [e]mploy it to such
purposes, and by such measures, as they would not have known, and own not will-
ingly.
LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 360. Hence, governmental power is 
only legitimate if it is not “[a]rbitrary and at [the] [p]leasure” of the rulers—only where the 
rulers are “kept within their bounds.” The solution is for government to “establish and prom-
ulgate laws,” which, in turn, also allows citizens to “know their [d]uty, and be safe and secure 
within the limits of the [l]aw.” Id.
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relationship to liberty. To better appreciate the distinction between these 
two perspectives, consider the following contrasting examples of hypothet-
ical legal regimes.
A legal regime comprised of periodically published compendia of 
properly noticed directives reflecting the whims of a dictator would be both 
entirely arbitrary and entirely predictable.
184
Such a regime—we could call it 
Hayek’s “liberal dictatorship,”
185
provided it did not disturb market institu-
tions—would satisfy the weak-form condition, but not the strong-form con-
dition. It would also plainly contravene most robust conceptions of a liberal 
government. From the strong-form perspective, such a regime would per-
haps qualify as rule by law (or “law and order”), but certainly not as rule of
law.
186
Conversely, a regime in which legislation is nearly universally per-
ceived to be non-arbitrary, but which occasionally alters some legal sub-
jects’ expectations in non-trivial ways, would satisfy the strong-form condi-
tion, but not the weak-form condition. Moreover, few would hesitate to 
describe such a strong-form predictable regime as basically liberal, notwith-
standing the occasional predictability shortfalls. Clearly, the liberal rule of 
law draws normative force from the strong form, but not the weak form. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that the strong form of the predictability princi-
ple, deriving as it does from liberty interests, influences U.S. constitutional 
law doctrine.
187
By contrast, the weak-form principle is functional and instrumental, but 
not normative. For Hobbes, the desideratum is not Lockean liberty, but so-
cial order—ensuring that legal subjects act in a manner that is consistent 
with the sovereign’s will, however arbitrary that might be. In fact, the nor-
mative force of the weak-form predictability principle is always derivative 
of some other substantive principle.
188
If it is property rights for Hayek, it 
could just as easily be utilitarianism, market formation, clean air, or reli-
gious virtue for another theorist. Following Raz, the key point is that weak-
184. Arbitrary here is used to refer to laws that are crafted to promote any purpose not 
ostensibly in the interest of the subjects of those laws. See supra text accompanying notes 
130, 132, and 134.
185. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
186. See Mark Tushnet, Rule by Law or Rule of Law?, 22 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 79 (2014); 
see generally RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom 
Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
187. See supra note 153.
188. Weberian sociology provides a helpful frame here. Weak-form predictability might 
give the appearance of being based in pure formal-instrumental rationality, but it also neces-
sarily disguises a substantive-value rationality foundation. See 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 24–25, 85–86 (Guenther Roth & 
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff trans., 1968) (elaborating related distinctions of instru-
mental rationality versus value rationality and formal rationality versus substantive rationali-
ty).
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form predictability sees the legal system as an instrument that, if it is to 
achieve any normative force, must borrow it from somewhere else.
189
But 
therein lies the rub; weak-form predictability can be an instrument for any 
number of ends, none of which has any necessary connection to the princi-
ples of freedom and non-arbitrariness on which a liberal legal order is 
thought to depend. As Mark Tushnet worries, when the constituents of the 
rule of law become “only a requirement of justification according to some 
substantive ideological narrative, the rule of law is thinned down yet fur-
ther— perhaps almost to the vanishing point.”
190
In summary, when considering the important predictability principle of 
the rule of law, we should distinguish between a strong form of the principle 
and a weak form of the principle. The former takes aim at arbitrary power 
and has august normative roots in Lockean liberal political theory. On the 
other hand, the latter lacks any normative pretensions and represents instead
an instrumental attribute of the legal order that accommodates and promotes 
ends that are supplied exogenously. It will struggle to summon the norma-
tive strength to muster a counterargument in the face of a predictable, but 
ultimately arbitrary, legal system.
191
3. A Brief Excursus: The Legal Singularity as Belated Fulfillment of the 
Legal Realist Project
By this point, readers versed in American legal theory will have appre-
ciated how predictive legal analytics calls to mind the jurisprudential per-
spective of legal realism. The legal realists merit special attention here be-
cause today’s futurists should be thought of as carrying forward the once-
moribund project of yesterday’s realists. Without acknowledging it express-
ly, they are purporting to resuscitate legal realism using the tools of predic-
tive legal analytics. By taking note of the similarities and differences be-
tween the futurist and realist treatments of the predictability principle, we 
can better appreciate the jurisprudential significance of legal futurism and 
the legal singularity.
192
In the early- to mid-twentieth century, the legal realists depicted the le-
gal system as a regime that was shot through with unacknowledged arbitrar-
189. See supra text accompanying notes 179–180.
190. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and the Rule of Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO THE RULE OF LAW (Jens Meierhenrich & Martin Loughlin eds., forthcoming 
July 2021).
191. Here, Habermas’s critique of pure-form legal positivism as being indifferent even 
to a “voluntarism of pure enactment” captures this threat of a coercive legal system resulting 
from nothing more than the formal translation, or enactment, of a lawmaker’s arbitrary will, or 
voluntas, into law. HABERMAS, supra note 101, at 38.
192. In their insightful introduction to their new edited volume, Simon Deakin and 
Christopher Markou trace the intellectual forebears of the legal singularity and computational 
law further back—to Hobbes, Bacon, and Leibniz. See Deakin & Markou, supra note 68.
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iness, but which nevertheless remained largely predictable. In other words, 
they advanced the theory that the legal system might be susceptible to pre-
dictive analysis, but only in the weak form. They remained conspicuously 
disinterested in questions concerning the source of law’s normative force, 
content to posit instead the empirical reality of law as a social phenomenon.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great proto-realist, believed that le-
gal doctrine was nothing more than “systematized prediction.”
193
Unlike the 
strong-form liberals, though, his vision of a predictable legal system was 
shrunken and stripped of any normative foundation of liberty and non-
arbitrariness. According to Holmes, we could begin to understand the law 
only if we put ourselves in the shoes of a “bad man” who “cares only for the 
material consequences [that] knowledge [of the law] enables him to pre-
dict.”
194
Holmes’s bad man “does not care two straws for . . . axioms or de-
ductions,” but “he does want to know what the Massachusetts or English 
courts are likely to do in fact.”
195
Holmes would go on to famously an-
nounce that “[t]he prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing 
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”
196
Several decades later, Karl Llewellyn carried the Holmesian project 
forward, broadening the basic insight to apply not only to judges but any 
other officials acting to quell disputes, such as administrators and legisla-
tors. Llewellyn regarded the law as the discipline of discerning the “regular-
ity which makes possible prediction of what [legal] officials are about to do 
tomorrow.”
197
Other realists expressed the same basic idea.
198
They attribut-
ed a functional role to the rule of law, focusing on law as a sort of anticipa-
193. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897).
194. Id. at 459.
195. Id. at 460–61.
196. Id. at 461.
197. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 13 (3d 
ed. 1960).
198. Jerome Frank, following Holmes, claimed that the law was simply probable guesses 
as to the future decisions of judges. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 50–51
(Anchor Books ed. 1963). The following passage from Walter Wheeler Cook succinctly 
summarizes the legal realist method of legal analysis:
As lawyers we are interested in knowing how certain officials of society—judges, 
legislators, and others—have behaved in the past, in order that we may make a pre-
diction of their probable behavior in the future. Our statements of the ‘law’ . . . are 
therefore ‘true’ if they accurately and as simply as possible describe the past behav-
ior and predict the future behavior of these societal agents. . . . ‘Right,’ ‘duty,’ and
other names for legal relations are therefore not names of objects or entities which 
have an existence apart from the behavior of officials in question, but merely terms 
by means of which we describe to each other what prophecies we make as to the 
probable occurrence of a certain sequence of events—the behavior of officials.
Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
457, 475–76 (1924).
144 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:97
tory social emollient.
199
With the realists, we see the inner operations of the 
Hobbesian weak-form predictability at work, anticipating how legal rules 
apply consequences in order to preemptively “prevent brawls.”
200
Legal realism saw law as a social science without any privileged nor-
mative perch. It invited the naïve doctrinaires to investigate and uncover 
that disguised “something else,” beyond the rules, that is “at work helping 
the doctrine out.”
201
The aim of the realists was to demystify the rigid for-
malisms and conceptual apparatuses that operated as the “basic myth” of the 
legal system, the “stubborn illusion” that the law could banish arbitrariness 
and discretion.
202
They sought to interrogate the “hidden regularities that lie 
below the doctrinal surface,” frequently using empirical social science.
203
Their mission was to master weak-form predictability, and they implicitly
rejected strong-form predictability as yet another example of the “transcen-
dental nonsense” stultifying law as it really existed—that is, as an irreduci-
bly social, and frequently arbitrary, process.
204
Nevertheless, by the end of World War II, much of the vigor of legal 
realism appeared to have been sapped. Thurman Arnold pronounced around 
this time that the critical methods of the realists had revealed themselves not 
to be “sustaining food for a stable civilization.”
205
But why not? Perhaps 
such a fate awaits all critical projects, even those, like legal realism, whose 
acts of negation are fundamentally an invitation at reinvention and recon-
ceptualization.
206
Or perhaps there is some factor that makes law, an inher-
ently normative discipline, especially resistant to critical projects.
207
To be clear, Arnold did not claim that realism was rejected as invalid, 
or that realism did not exercise an enduring influence over legal theory 
throughout the twentieth century. At the time he made his observation, the 
other two pillars of mid-twentieth century jurisprudence—legal positivism 
and the legal process school—were responding directly to legal realism, 
199. LLEWELLYN , supra note 197, at 22 (“[Law] ceases to be merely a regulation of 
actual disputes and becomes a regulation, and if all goes well, an anticipation and prevention, 
of potential disputes vastly greater in number than the actual.”).
200. See supra text accompanying note 155 (quoting Hobbes).
201. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 135 
(1962).
202. FRANK, supra note 198, at 3, 14.
203. Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 335, 337 (1988).
204. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
205. Thurman Arnold, Judge Jerome Frank, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 635 (1957).
206. See Seyla Benhabib, Modernity and the Aporias of Critical Theory, 49 TELOS 39, 
44 (1981); ROGER COTTERRELL, LAW’S COMMUNITY: LEGAL THEORY IN SOCIOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 207–08 (1997).
207. After all, a similar fate would await the critical legal studies program of the 1980s 
and 1990s. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT:
ANOTHER TIME, A GREATER TASK 15 (2015).
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seeking to recover law’s normative equilibrium from the blows inflicted by 
realism.
208
Today, all American lawyers are, to a significant degree, intellec-
tual descendants of Holmes and the realists, and have internalized their 
preference for description over prescription.
209
Nevertheless, the stickiness 
of normativity in the law is equally obvious. Lawyers might tell their clients
“This is what the judge will do,” but they tell the judge “This is what you
should do, your honor.” The normative validity of law persists, notwith-
standing the accompanying residuum of discretion on the part of govern-
ment officials, and lawyers understand that legal practice entails something 
more than weak-form prediction. But this appeal to normativity is required, 
in part, because the realists failed to provide clear indications for how to 
eliminate legal uncertainty. They failed to demonstrate that legal practice 
could be nothing more than applied weak-form prediction.
Today’s legal futurism makes the legal realist project ripe and relevant 
again. The tantalizing possibility dancing in the eyes of the futurists is the 
fulfilment of the realist project. If the realists failed to discover the predic-
tive keys to unlock the secrets of the legal machine through meticulous so-
cial scientific research, perhaps the legal futurists of today can cut the key 
more precisely through the use of better data and algorithmic learning.
4. How the Legal Singularity Would Compromise the Strong-Form 
Predictability Principle—and with It, the Rule of Law
The legal futurists describe the legal singularity in terms that emphasize 
weak-form predictability alone. Their project is to eliminate legal uncertain-
ty. They, like the legal realists, have jettisoned any commitment to strong-
form predictability and the values of liberty and non-arbitrariness it pro-
motes. Consequently, they have shed the normative ballast of the rule of law 
and sail on new and choppy waters. However, whereas the realists, who 
were equally excited about predictive inquiry, were fundamentally engaged 
in a radically critical project, defining their work in distinction to the nor-
mative consensus of their times in order to overcome it and imagine a richer 
account of law, the legal futurists justify their project in terms of a rather 
208. More recently, Habermas’s later work is devoted to exploring this very phenome-
non, which he discusses as the immanent “facticity-validity tension” in contemporary legal 
systems. HABERMAS, supra note 101, at 38–41. What explains how law enjoys a special valid-
ity claim sufficient to legitimate, without recourse to force, the imposition of all manner of 
duties and restrictions? Furthermore, how does it do so even in a desacralized, differentiated, 
pluralistic society?
209. See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45, 46 (2015). 
U.S. law schools waste no time in indoctrinating students into the legal realist method. First-
year law school curricula almost invariably require students to compose memoranda predict-
ing what judges will do, and almost never require students to create prescriptive norms by 
drafting contracts or legislation.
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vulgar logic of optimization and rationalization.
210
They frequently write in 
term of efficiencies, streamlining, and cost-reduction, with little regard for 
the normative fallout of their project.
211
They tend to conceive of legal sub-
jects, including people, as mere means to pre-specified institutional ends.
212
In one striking example, a pair of economists with futurist sympathies re-
cently justified their proposal to replace all human judges with “digital 
courts” by citing “high judicial cost.”
213
To be clear, the proposal is to elim-
inate human judges from the administration of justice in order to save the 
costs of administering the judicial system. For perspective, the budget for 
the federal judiciary last year was 0.033% of national gross domestic prod-
uct.
214
Of course, there is nothing intrinsically objectionable about optimiza-
tion and efficiency—who would object to getting better answers to legal 
questions at less cost? Still, most futurists remain troublingly silent concern-
ing whether—and, if so, in what form—the legal system will even survive if 
it is reduced to mere weak-form prediction. Instead, the futurists approach 
the legal system as a ready-formed thing
215
that they would like to under-
stand better and, ultimately, to make susceptible to predictive analysis. They 
see law only as an empirical fact, and not as a social process.
216
In Haber-
210. See Charles M. A. Clark & Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan, Artificial Intelligence and 
Human Flourishing, 79 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 1307, 1336 (2020) (“Optimization programs are 
based on neoclassical economic theory and the ‘rational economic person’ model, so only 
quantitative variables (such as profits) are deemed important.”); William H. Simon, Optimiza-
tion and Its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank Regulation as an Example, 4 REG. &
GOV. 3, 4–5 (2009) (describing a reductionist “vulgar optimization” approach to management 
and governance that privileges cost minimization at the expense of concerns about reliability 
of dynamic and complex systems).
211. See Cobbe, supra note 6 (“Through quantification and rationalization, through the 
replacement of traditional, fundamental legal values with logics of cost-saving, speed, and 
efficiency prioritized through automation, these market logics are brought into the heart of 
law.”).
212. See Ian Kerr, Prediction, Pre-emption, Presumption: The Path of Law After the 
Computational Turn, in PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN 91, 112 
(Mireille Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds., 2013).
213. See Matsushima & Noda, supra note 75, at 2.
214. See THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CT., THE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2020
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUMMARY 1 (2020) (listing the 2019 federal judiciary budget as 
$7.3 billion); BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, BEA 20–04, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT,
FOURTH QUARTER AND YEAR 2019 (ADVANCE ESTIMATE) (2020), https://www.bea.gov
/news/2020/gross-domestic-product-fourth-quarter-and-year-2019-advance-estimate#:~:text=
Current%2Ddollar%20GDP%20increased%204.1,table%201%20and%20table%203) (listing 
2019 U.S. gross domestic as $21.43 trillion).
215. In this respect, their approach is fundamentally positivist in that it posits the legal 
system as it is as an object of scientific inquiry.
216. On this point, consider the possibility that stripping the rule of law down to weak-
form prediction, and consequently losing much of law’s normative force, might produce cas-
cading complexities in the legal system that frustrate the very efforts on the part of the predic-
tive software to predict what the law is. In other words, are we taking for granted embedded, 
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masian terms, they seek to achieve unprecedented insights into the facticity 
of law, with little regard for preserving the sources of the legitimacy of 
law.
217
All this is to raise the possibility of arbitrary algorithmic rule. For in-
stance, if law is just weak-form prediction, will the legal system be able to
summon the rule of law principle to mount a normative challenge to a Hay-
ekian “liberal dictatorship” in algorithmic form? If the post-singularity legal 
system starts to resolve legal disputes and provide advance legal guidance in 
ways that are arbitrary in the liberal sense described above—that is, they 
lack any publicly-minded rationale and cannot credibly maintain the ap-
pearance of enjoying the public’s consent—what, if any, of the normative 
force of law will remain? And if a normatively grounded rule of law princi-
ple can no longer play a role in that project, must we then look to other 
sources of legitimation outside of the rule of law to resist arbitrary algorith-
mic rule—such as democracy, due process, fairness, rationality—even revo-
lution?
218
If we return to the earlier discussion concerning the relationship be-
tween the rule of law and the problem of government discretion,
219
we can 
better appreciate the problem. We have already seen how the legal singulari-
ty will banish human discretion from the legal system altogether. However, 
we have also seen how that result will only satisfy those for whom arbitrari-
ness in government is only a matter of human error. But even if we imagine 
a post-singularity world where human governmental actors no longer wield 
discretion to apply governmental power over others, is there some deeper 
normative kernel of non-arbitrariness that we would prefer to nevertheless 
survive? Certainly, anyone who believes the law expresses structural eco-
nomic forces that impede human freedom —if true, a gross arbitrary imposi-
tion of power—will answer this question in the affirmative.
220
But so too 
structural checks and balances in the legal system (qua a social process embedded in institu-
tions) that repel arbitrary government, but which only work in an environment where law’s
legitimacy is largely a taken-for-granted fact? And if we remove that condition, is the system 
even susceptible to prediction? The futurists leave these questions unresolved—indeed, unex-
amined and unacknowledged.
217. See supra text accompanying note 101 (using Habermas’s distinction between the 
“facticity” (positive empirical validity) of law and the legitimacy of law to frame the Article’s
main argument).
218. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249 (2008) (developing notion of “technological due process” to meet new challenges of 
algorithmic governance).
219. See supra Part III.B.
220. See Julieta Lemaitre, Legal Fetishism at Home and Abroad, 3 UNBOUND 6, 8 n.9 
(2007) (“Legal fetishism masks a reality not just in the sense that it hides the human origin of 
law, or its substantive partiality to dominant interests, but in that it hides power differentials in 
legal relationships through the form of the ‘natural’ legal subject.”). For three classic ac-
counts, see EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 78–79
(Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet eds., Peter B. Maggs trans., 1980); NICOS POULANTZAS,
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should anyone who values the Lockean precept that legal authorities—
including, in the future, algorithms—that make the law should legislate and 
regulate in a manner that does not impose upon legal subjects restrictions to 
which they would not agree.
221
If we maintain that algorithmic governance can also produce arbitrary 
laws, even despite the absence of identifiable human legislators, then the 
same problems remain. John Danaher has referred to this problem as the 
threat of “algocracy.”
222
Scholars are busily producing excellent work doc-
umenting how predictive analytic technologies are being deployed in an ex-
isting system of institutions and social relations, focusing attention on who 
is writing algorithms and to what ends.
223
The human actors exercising dis-
cretion might eventually disappear, but on their way out they are going to 
shape the institutional and computational environment out of which the le-
gal singularity will emerge. Here, the issue is that the omnipresent problem 
of arbitrariness in the law is woven algorithmically into the law just as the 
last vestiges of human responsibility and blame dissolve, leaving the legal 
system insusceptible to review and contestation. The rule of law cannot be 
said to obtain where a system of predictable but arbitrary laws governs legal 
subjects powerless to check the arbitrariness of those rules. This is where 
the prospect of regimes like Hayekian “liberal dictatorship” should caution 
the futurists and embolden their critics.
To further clarify the powerlessness of legal subjects, it is helpful to re-
call the earlier discussion concerning the condition of computational irre-
ducibility—which, again, will entail autonomous black-boxing of the entire 
legal system.
224
By definition, irreducibility will prevent legal subjects from 
understanding the “why” behind any predictive judgment about the law. The 
power of strong-form, Lockean predictability is that it operates as a proce-
dural transparency mechanism, forcing the government to make its exercise 
of coercive power not just discernible, but also contestable and amenable to 
demands for justification.
225
If the legal singularity results in an opaque, but 
predictable, legal system that never makes itself susceptible to critique and 
revision by legal subjects, it will fall well short of that standard.
Instead, a shrunken rule of law predicated on weak-form predictability 
will be powerless to counteract governmental arbitrariness. The law will
emerge as a form of technical or instrumental rationality geared toward cal-
culation and prediction, but incapable of engaging with consideration of the 
STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM 86–92 (Patrick Camiller trans, 2014); LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ON THE 
REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM: IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 59 (G. 
M. Goshgarian trans., 2014).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 145–146.
222. Danaher, supra note 10.
223. See supra note 98.
224. See supra text accompanying note 79 (discussing computational irreducibility).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 144–146.
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ends of law and policy,
226
let alone the welfare of the polity.
227
The German 
legal and political theorist Otto Kirchheimer, writing at the outset of World 
War II, described the legal order of National Socialism in terms that reso-
nate with the description of weak-form predictability presented here:
In short, the idea of technical rationality which underlies the new 
governmental organization actually finds its nearest approximation 
in a perfectly running, though complicated, piece of machinery.
Nobody save the owners is entitled to question the meaningfulness 
of the services which the machine performs: the engineers who ac-
tually operate it have to content themselves with producing imme-
diate reactions to the owners’ changing commands. They may be 
ordered to change some technical processes and to attain some var-
iations in output. The purport of the results achieved lies beyond 
this kind of rationality, which is aimed only at the certainty that 
every order will produce an exactly calculable reaction.
228
To be clear, the argument is hardly that the path of predictive legal analytics 
will lead to totalitarianism. Nevertheless, it is difficult to observe in real 
time the social ramifications of the erosion of important institutions like the 
rule of law, and the totalitarian experience of the twentieth century provides 
a limiting case for what happens when the rule of law disintegrates com-
pletely. Legal theorists wishing to reckon with the implications of rule by 
algorithmic arbitrariness would do well to review the deep engagement of 
post-war legal theory with the disintegration of the rule of law during totali-
tarian regimes.
229
Bearing in mind the hypothetical nature of the thought ex-
periment motivating this Article, these sources are not just fair game, they 
are also important reference points.
226. This theme of a pervasive technical rationality that overwhelms the ability of hu-
man reason to determine the aims of social action is one of the foundational ideas of the 
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, with which Kirchheimer (quoted here just below) was 
associated. See, e.g., MAX HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON 1–39 (Bloomsbury Acad. 
2013) (1947).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 132–134 (explaining non-arbitrariness in gov-
ernment in terms of actions that are both motivated by concern for the polity and capable of 
credibly claiming the polity’s consent).
228. OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, The Legal Order of National Socialism, in POLITICS, LAW 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE: SELECTED ESSAYS OF OTTO KIRCHHEIMER 88, 101 (Frederic S. Burin 
& Kurt L. Shell eds., 1969) (1941) (emphasis added).
229. See William E. Scheuerman, Introduction, in THE RULE OF LAW UNDER SIEGE:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND OTTO KIRCHHEIMER 1, 2 (1996) (“Whereas 
many contemporary radical legal scholars suggest that we should welcome [the undermining 
of the rule of law], Neumann and Kirchheimer powerfully argue that we very much need to 
acknowledge its ambivalent and in many ways truly worrisome implications.”).
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D. The Legal Singularity and the Universality Principle
The other core pillar of the liberal rule of law is that the law must be 
universal; it must apply generally to all.
230
The rule of law’s “universality 
principle,” just like the strong form of the predictability principle, promotes 
the liberal legal order’s commitment to avoiding arbitrary exercises of gov-
ernment power. And just as the legal singularity sacrifices much of the rule 
of law’s normative force by privileging weak-form predictability over a 
deeper commitment to non-arbitrary government, it concedes further norma-
tive ground by both exposing how, and aggravating the extent to which, law 
falls short of achieving the universality principle.
1. The Universality Principle
As with predictability, the association of the rule of law with universali-
ty traces back to early liberal thought.
231
For example, Locke considered 
universality to be a precondition of any lawful legislation, requiring that 
laws not “be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and 
poor, for the favorite at court, and the country man at plough.”
232
In another 
passage, Locke noted that laws should be “common to every one of that so-
ciety.”
233
Nearly a century later, Blackstone made the same point, describing law 
in the following terms:
234
[F]irst, [law] is a rule; not a transient sudden order from a superior, 
to or concerning a particular person; but something permanent, uni-
form and universal. Therefore a particular act of the legislature to 
confiscate the goods of Titius, or to attaint him of high treason, 
does not enter into the idea of a municipal law; for the operation of 
this act is spent upon Titius only, and has no relation to the com-
munity in general; it is rather a sentence than a law. But an act to 
declare that the crime of which Titius is accused shall be deemed 
230. The idea of equality is a conceptual cognate, although equality is a broader term 
than universality in some respects. Laws apply generally, and are therefore universal in this 
sense, if they are consistent with the condition that is sometimes referred to as procedural 
equality or formal equality. Defined this way, the concept is relieved of the weightier burden 
of satisfying objectives relating to substantive equality.
231. Indeed, it traces back further, at least to Ancient Rome. Tacitus despaired that in the
waning years of the Republic, “bills began to pass, not only of national but of purely individu-
al application, and when the state was most corrupt, laws were most abundant.” See III THE 
ANNALS OF TACITUS 567 (Loeb Classical Library ed. 1931).
232. LOCKE, TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 8, at 363.
233. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
234. In this quoted passage, Blackstone discusses “municipal law,” a category that ap-
plies not only to what we would recognize today as local government law, but also “to any 
one state or nation, which is governed by the same laws and customs.” BLACKSTONE, supra
note 9.
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high treason; this has permanency, uniformity, and universality, 
and therefore is properly a rule.
235
Hence, the rule of law is present where a legal system has “one rule for rich 
and poor” and directs itself to the “community in general” in terms that are 
“uniform” and “universal.”
Rousseau was the greatest classical expositor of the importance of uni-
versality to the rule of law. Rousseau insisted that “the object of the laws is 
always general,” and added that:
the law considers the subjects as a body, and their actions in the ab-
stract, never any man as an individual or any particular action. Thus 
the law can very well enact that there will be privileges, but it can-
not confer them on any one by name . . . [I]n a word, any function 
that relates to an individual object does not fall within the province 
of the legislative power.
236
The rule of law can only be present when law applies to an abstract and 
never particularized legal subject. In this way, the law “combines the uni-
versality of the will with that of the object.”
237
Here, “universality of will”
refers to Rousseau’s notion of the “general will” embodied in his idea of so-
cial contract, but the relevant part of the passage for present purposes is his 
notion of law’s “universality of object.” The law can only embody the gen-
eral will if it is directed to the general public. Otherwise, the laws amount 
only to “iniquitous decrees with no other end in view than private interest[,] 
falsely passed under the name of Laws.”
238
In those circumstances, the legal 
system is better characterized—much like the state of affairs described by 
the weak-form predictability principle—as rule by law, not rule of law.239
This Rousseauian conception of the universality principle underlies 
twentieth century accounts of the rule of law as well. For his part, Rawls be-
lieved that a core constituent of the rule of law was that a legal system’s
statutes “be general both in statement and intent.”
240
Hayek distinguished 
laws from mere commands on account of their “generality and abstract-
ness.”
241
We must nevertheless acknowledge—in response to Locke, Blackstone, 
and Rousseau—that a society can still participate in the liberal rule of law 
even if that society does not treat all citizens equally. Rousseau recognized 
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATE POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 69 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2018) (1762).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 125.
239. See supra text accompanying note 186.
240. RAWLS, supra note 115, at 209.
241. HAYEK, supra note 163, at 149.
152 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 27:97
the tension between his normative conception of universal law arising from 
the general will and the empirical reality of the interest group power dynam-
ics at play in government.
242
The universality principle must tilt, at least a 
little, in the wind of interest politics, or otherwise risk irrelevance as a de-
scription of actual liberal societies.
243
Thus, universality is to be approximat-
ed rather than fulfilled, and the degree to which a legal system can credibly 
describe itself as being consistent with the rule of law depends in large part 
on the degree to which it approximates this universality ideal.
The implicit bedrock of the universality principle is that the differences 
among legal subjects are outweighed by what they—”we” or, better still, 
“We” who are the “community in general”—have in common. The rule of 
law requires that government must direct its action generally and in the in-
terest of the polity, and it also must restrain its natural inclination to favor 
its members or associated social classes or groups.
Our local constitutional expressions of the universality principle are the 
Equal Protection Clause
244
and the Bill of Attainder Clause.
245
The universal-
ity principle also underlies the Free Exercise Clause’s prohibition of gov-
ernment singling out religious groups for disparate treatment.
246
It also mo-
tivates the Madisonian system of checks and balances, which protects 
against targeted, faction-fomented oppression of minorities and individu-
als.
247
Further, the Separation of Powers principle prevents the legislature 
from passing draconian laws that are expected to be executed and applied to 
others, but not to them.
248
The principle also animates state constitutional 
prohibitions on “special legislation” or “private laws.”
249
242. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 236, at 125 (describing how, even in liberal states, the 
“basest interest brazenly assumes the sacred name of public good” while the “general will 
grows mute”); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ÉMILE, OR EDUCATION 197–98 (Barbara Foxley 
trans., 1911) (1762) (decrying the “vain and chimerical equality of right” in liberal states in 
light of the “inevitable” reality that the “universal spirit of the laws of every country is always 
to take the part of the strong against the weak”).
243. See Holmes, supra note 121, at 22 (“Even the most advanced Rechtsstaat remains 
to some extent a Doppelstaat.”).
244. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
245. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed”); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 
(No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder”).
246. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi-Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993).
247. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 276 (1998); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 4–6 (1997).
248. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 344 (James Madison) (Cynthia Johnson ed., 2004); 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989) (1748) 
(“When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person . . . there is no 
liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will 
execute them tyrannically.”).
249. See FULLER, supra note 121, at 47 n.4.
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2. How the Legal Singularity Would Compromise the Universality 
Principle—and with It, the Rule of Law
The legal singularity could undercut the universality principle in two 
ways. First, by cementing algorithmically any existing inequalities in the 
application of law, it might unveil systemic, if not structural, divergences 
between law’s universalistic self-description and its empirical realities. Sec-
ond, and even more fundamentally, the arrival of the legal singularity would 
announce the dissolution of the basic categories from which the universality 
of law achieves its normative force. As to this latter point, the epistemology 
of data analytics can only make sense of pulverized, atomistic bits of data, 
which undermines the status of—indeed, arguably makes unintelligible—
any universal groupings of legal subjects.
First, the singularity might unveil the extent to which law falls short of 
the universality principle, thereby undercutting claims of normative force 
that rely on it. The idea that the legal system might result in the systemic 
exploitation of classes of citizens preoccupied political theorists as diverse 
as Marx and Madison.
250
To abide by the rule of law, a liberal legal system 
must avoid that fate. With the legal singularity, users of software could ob-
tain precisely tailored answers to any legal questions. If it turns out that em-
bedded inequalities in the practical application of enacted laws abound, then 
they would be cemented into the software’s algorithmic structure.
251
Exam-
ples of this dynamic outside the legal context already abound. For example, 
an algorithm for picking beauty contestants recently revealed itself to prefer 
whiteness.
252
Similarly, a healthcare algorithm using healthcare expenditures 
as a proxy for health directed resources away from black patients and to-
wards white patients on the grounds that the former used fewer medical re-
sources—a circumstance attributable entirely to their relative lack of access 
to care.
253
The software might tell us that a black victim of overzealous police pur-
suit should expect dismissal of a civil rights lawsuit that an otherwise iden-
tically situated white victim could successfully pursue. Or that an Ivy 
League graduate from Connecticut turns out to have a greater empirical en-
titlement to a banking charter than an otherwise identically situated public 
university graduate from Montana. Or that persons with bona fide psycho-
logical disabilities should expect less solicitous treatment from courts decid-
250. Marx worried about the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie, while 
Madison worried about the exploitation of unpopular minorities by “factions.”
251. See generally Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019).
252. Sam Levin, A Beauty Contest Was Judged by AI and the Robots Didn’t Like Dark 
Skin, GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/08
/artificial-intelligence-beauty-contest-doesnt-like-black-people.
253. Ziad Obermeyer et al., Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the 
Health of Populations, 366 SCIENCE 447, 450 (2019).
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ing ADA cases than plaintiffs with much less debilitating physical condi-
tions. Or that otherwise objectionable authoritarian policies are made less 
susceptible to effective judicial restraint if they are accompanied by pro 
forma language announcing the policies. Or that criminal sentence impris-
onment terms are partially a function of the extent to which defendant first 
names are perceived to be traditional. Or that it is possible to predict the 
likelihood of success on the merits of one’s employment discrimination 
claim by inputting one’s race, income tax bracket, 401(k) balance, zip code, 
and last name into the software. Or, more troubling still, it might enable a 
company’s management to track the same parameters for use in setting ceil-
ings for maximally permitting workplace discrimination without fear of en-
forcement. The software could churn out similar predictive insights with re-
spect to enforcement patterns. Thus, for instance, we might discover that the 
protective force of the Fourth Amendment depends more on one’s voting 
precinct than on the conduct of the suspect or the police.
Before the legal singularity, these questions would amount to empirical 
inquiries for social scientists that might or might not attract interest from le-
gal authorities. However, the idea of the legal singularity, which invites us 
to imagine a legal system on autopilot, would seemingly entrench these pat-
terns as structural facts to which we must resign ourselves, rather than em-
pirically revealed biases we might endeavor to fix. Indeed, machine-
learning algorithms tend to accelerate these effects, so that the legal singu-
larity will not only reflect and reproduce existing hierarchies and inequali-
ties,
254
it will further embed and normalize them.
255
Of course, these are all hypothetical findings to which the legal singu-
larity could possibly open our eyes; some of them may strike readers as 
more plausible than others. They are intended only as possible examples of 
how predictive legal analytics might reveal divergences between law’s
claim to universality and its actual operative distinctions. Nevertheless, any 
empirically observable systemic divergences from the universality principle 
would threaten to demystify the idea of equal justice before the law. It 
would confirm with empirical validity and institutionalize with algorithmic 
automaticity what had previously amounted only to a political rallying cry: 
that the legal system applies differently to different people.
256
254. Mayson, supra note 251, at 2227.
255. Adrian Mackenzie, The Production of Prediction: What Does Machine Learning 
Want?, 18 EUR. J. CULT. STUD. 429, 442 (2015) (“The more effectively the models operate in 
the world, the more they tend to normalize the situations in which they are entangled.”).
256. Note that the legal singularity’s relationship with unequal application of the laws 
would pose two related threats. On the one hand, the legal singularity might cement the per-
verse social effects resulting from unequal application of law referred to above in Section II.E.
On the other hand, as discussed here, exposing the unequal application of law might also un-
dercut the legal system’s pretensions of universality and, with that, it might strip the system of 
the normative weight provided by the rule of law.
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In the lead-up to the legal singularity, it might be possible to correct for 
shortfalls in the legal system’s pretensions of universality revealed by earli-
er-stage predictive analytic tools.
257
These ameliorative efforts apply not on-
ly to the human-centered legal system, but also to the artificial intelligence 
underlying the newer predictive legal analytic technologies.
258
However, the 
point of the singularity thought experiment is that at some point the humans 
will need to relinquish control to the algorithms, even with respect to these 
ad hoc corrective adjustments. At that point, legal systems face two alterna-
tives that are equal parts daunting and improbable: either remedy all of the 
ways that legal systems fall short of the universality ideal before the singu-
larity occurs or embed a universality principle in software that is up to the 
task of instantiating algorithmically the ideal of universal justice.
Having said all that, lawyers should only worry about this problem if it 
turns out that the law is in fact systematically unequal in its application. If, 
on the other hand, the legal singularity does not turn out to cement systemic 
exploitation of classes of citizens, then there is no need to fear that an algo-
rithmic installation of arbitrary inequality in the law will undermine the rule 
of law.
Nevertheless, the legal singularity would inflict a second, and more 
mortal, wound to the normative pretensions of a rule of law predicated on 
universality. To situate this deeper dilemma, consider the following descrip-
tion of a latent tension in the self-description of the legal systems of modern 
liberal societies. As discussed at length earlier, liberal legal systems insist 
that the central attributes of the rule of law are predictability and universali-
ty. However, there is something peculiar about saying that the normative 
force of law depends on general and universal applicability, all the while 
emphasizing how important it is for the law to allow for predictive judg-
ments about how it will apply to particular persons and cases.
The tension is obscured in the ordinary course by the unstated episte-
mological assumption that it is simply impossible to predict with certainty 
the outcome of any particular legal matter. Hence the familiar care with 
which lawyers couch their conclusions in legal memoranda and opinion let-
ters, cabining them delicately to a hypothetical, formalistic scenario that 
cannot, in fact, exist: “assuming these facts alone,” “we have only reviewed 
these materials,” “a court would likely,” and so forth. The lawyerly cliché of 
257. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 61–62.
258. In the meantime, we should expect calls for developing predictive legal analytics 
technologies to be made subject to the emerging subfield of computer science known as “fair-
ness, accountability, and transparency in machine learning” (improbably acronymized as 
“FAT ML”), which aims to adopt quality control and audit-style institutional norms for ma-
chine-learning and artificial intelligence. See generally MICHAEL KEARNS & AARON ROTH,
THE ETHICAL ALGORITHM: THE SCIENCE OF SOCIALLY AWARE ALGORITHM DESIGN (2019); 
GARY MARCUS & ERNEST DAVIS, REBOOTING AI: BUILDING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WE 
CAN TRUST (2019).
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starting every answer with “it depends” derives from the same source. More 
substantively, the concept of the burden of proof, so important to the law, 
always carries a qualified grammar. The law never requires certainty in its 
determinations, instead requiring fact finders to make determinations by, 
e.g., a “preponderance of evidence.” By using these devices, the legal sys-
tem implicitly acknowledges its indeterminacy and disguises the universali-
ty-particularity tension. The legal singularity thought experiment allows us 
to remove that epistemological assumption, and to imagine a legal system 
scrubbed of messy uncertainties.
Earlier in the Article, we explored how predictive analytics should be 
thought of not merely as a new technological tool, but also an expression of 
a new epistemological reality—a new way that society produces and under-
stands knowledge.
259
We noted how François Ewald has described a deep 
tension embedded in this new epistemology between an imperative to col-
lect and analyze universally, all the while embracing a “type of resolutely 
nominalist knowledge” that bans all universal categories and instead treats 
all data “one to one, without trying to erase their differences by integrating 
them into categories.”
260
Notwithstanding the massive aggregation of data, predictive analytics 
obeys a logic of differentiation:
The data is . . . a very powerful tool for analysis . . . and each ele-
ment of data must be treated for itself in its relations with others, as 
something unique, according to a logic of differentiation. . . . The 
isolated individual is not singular, every element is treated in rela-
tion to other elements. And the more elements, the more opportuni-
ties to identify its uniqueness, and therefore also to anticipate future 
behavior within a set. The largest mass goes along with the greatest 
differentiation.
261
Ewald identifies some obvious threats posed by this new epistemology of 
differentiated data, including social stigmas, discrimination in employment 
and insurance, and differential access to insurance and healthcare.
262
The de-
stabilizing effects of these phenomena on existing legal doctrines are al-
ready the subject of study.
263
But Ewald digs even deeper, warning that the new data epistemology 
might also destabilize our ideas about universal rights altogether:
259. See supra Section II.B.
260. Ewald, supra note 37, at 84–85.
261. Id. at 85.
262. Id. at 89.
263. See, e.g., Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Arti-
ficial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257 (2020); Ifeoma Ajunwa, Age Dis-
crimination by Platforms, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2019); Pauline T. Kim, Data-
Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857 (2017).
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[These threats] could introduce the idea that we are all so different 
that there would be little sense in aligning us, in identifying us all in 
such general categories as “Man” or “Humanity.” Do our differ-
ences outweigh what we have in common? For example, doesn’t
genetics teach us that our fates are no longer common in so far as 
we do not run the same risks? The threat here is not eugenics (it is 
not about selecting some as better than others), it is about the co-
herence of concepts like “human rights.”
264
One of the key themes of social theory for the past quarter century has been 
the so-called “death of the social”—the diminishing socio-political rele-
vance of the social insurance, social security, social work, social policy, and 
social welfare concepts by which twentieth century government justified, 
explained, and measured itself.
265
Ewald is implicitly invoking the death-of-
the-social literature; in fact, he expressly contrasts the epistemology of data 
with the epistemology of social insurance.
266
Still, it is significant that his 
illustrative example of the epistemological shift (universal rights) is drawn 
not from insurance, but from an attribute of the legal system that has always 
been at the core of the rule of law. The data epistemology threatens the legal 
system with a special injury because the legal system, concerned as it is 
with individual rights rather than social aggregates, has for the most part 
operated without threat of disruption from the death of the social. If the 
death of the social entails abstraction away from social aggregates, the ana-
lytics revolution zooms in even further, abstracting away from individual 
subjects, instead training its attention exclusively on subatomic, electronic 
bits of data.
At this point, the implications for the rule of law are apparent. The 
problem is not so much that the legal system is exposed as not abiding by 
the universality principle because it discriminates among races, classes, or 
factions, but rather that this new data epistemology—the ultimate expres-
sion of which in the legal field is the legal singularity—requires an atomistic 
pulverization of groups in general, including the citizenry, the polity, the 
264. Ewald, supra note 37, at 89.
265. See, e.g., NICHOLAS GANE, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL THEORY 178–79 (2004); Niko-
las Rose, The Death of the Social?: Re-figuring the Territory of Government, 25 ECON. &
SOC’Y 327 (1996); but cf. MITCHELL DEAN, GOVERNMENTALITY: POWER AND RULE IN 
MODERN SOCIETY 175–203 (2010) (arguing that the social has not so much died as it is simp-
ly in the process of being “reconfigured”).
266. The first English translation of Ewald’s history of the French welfare state, origi-
nally published in France in 1986 as L’État Providence, has just been published. In that text, 
he relies heavily on the concept of insurance to thematize and frame the development of twen-
tieth century government. See FRANÇOIS EWALD, THE BIRTH OF SOLIDARITY: THE HISTORY 
OF THE FRENCH WELFARE STATE 116 (Melinda Cooper ed., Timothy Scott Johnson trans., 
2020) (“A more general philosophy could be drawn from the technique of insurance, a politi-
cal philosophy from which we would derive the necessity of reforming the state and govern-
mental practices.”).
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“We the People,” Blackstone’s “community in general,” and so forth. The 
result is a perverse type of equality that promises only that the law would 
apply differently to each of us. Law would no longer entail abstract equali-
ty; it would entail particularistic inequality. As happens with the weak form 
of the predictability principle, the potential demise of law’s universality 
gives rise to the specter of arbitrary rule by law. It is unlikely that the rule of 
law would be able to survive such a development as a cognizable concept.
IV.  Concluding Remarks on Recommitting to Non-
Arbitrariness After the Singularity
This Article has argued that the legal singularity, if it were to occur, 
would likely disintegrate the two pillars that have historically buttressed the 
rule of law as a bulwark against arbitrary government—the predictability 
principle and the universality principle. The precise contours of this post-
singularity, algorithmic legal system (rule-by-law rather than rule-of-law) 
are outside the Article’s scope, except to the extent that the Article sounds a 
cautionary alarm that the system will likely come to resemble an “algocra-
cy” composed of arbitrary rules bearing little or no relationship to the con-
sent or welfare of legal subjects.
267
This concluding Part introduces some 
considerations for addressing the normative gap that the singularity would 
open up. The analysis presented to this point has amounted to a critique of 
legal futurism and the idea of the legal singularity, elucidating the ultimate 
tendency for the futurist perspective on legal technology to overwhelm and 
corrode the rule of law and, with it, liberal legalism itself. Nevertheless, this 
critique also points the way to a curious, but constructive, opportunity to 
steer the algorithmizing of law in a manner more consonant with our aspira-
tions for nonarbitrary, democratic self-government, as well as political and 
social justice.
268
Importantly, this opportunity might even facilitate a rap-
prochement between traditional liberals and those professing more radical 
and critical perspectives on law, joining them in a joint project to preserve 
the legal system against the unintended consequences of uncritical techno-
futurist enthusiasm.
The reflections sketched out here heed the call of progressive legal the-
orists like Roberto Unger and Jack Balkin, who emphasize that twenty-first 
century critical projects in legal theory must not only critique the normative 
deficit between law’s self-description and its empiric realities, but also build 
267. See Danaher, supra note 10, at 252–55.
268. As used here, the terms “social justice” and “political justice” are intended to paral-
lel Erik Olin Wright’s helpful definitions of those terms. See ERIK OLIN WRIGHT,
ENVISIONING REAL UTOPIAS 12 (2010) (defining social justice in terms of “broadly equal 
access to the necessary material and social means to lead fulfilling lives” and political justice 
as “broadly equal access to the necessary means to participate meaningfully in decisions about 
things which affect their lives”).
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new institutions and models that reduce that deficit.
269
In that spirit, it would 
not be sufficient to simply elucidate the immanent contradictions between 
legal futurism and the liberal rule of law. It would be far better to use the 
uncovering of those contradictions as an opportunity to create new strategic 
partnerships among otherwise divergent perspectives and traditions in an 
effort to expand the horizon of achievable emancipatory reform of legal 
technology.
270
From the perspective of left legal and political thought, such a 
project would contribute to the broader project to redeem and realize liberal 
ideals of substantive freedom, moving beyond both the hoary formalisms of 
bygone centuries and the real (and frequently racialized and gendered) lega-
cies of domination in putatively liberal societies.
271
For their part, the classical liberals who prize the rule of law as a bul-
wark against arbitrariness in government would lament the singularity for 
obvious reasons: their admiration for Locke, Rousseau, Blackstone, and the 
like leaves them no other option.
272
However, we should not assume that the 
universe of people preoccupied by the potential demise of the rule of law is 
limited to those with traditional liberal sympathies. To more fully appreciate 
the dilemma that the legal singularity would pose for the legal system, it is 
helpful to also look briefly to the writings of radical legal theorists writing 
269. See UNGER, supra note 207, at 26–32 (advocating for an “institutionalist” approach 
that uses legal reform to imagine and build alternative institutional arrangements for society); 
Jack Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 64, 67 
(Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009) (arguing that law even though law can “disguise, mystify, and 
legitimate great injustices,” it can also help us to create new “discursive and institutional tools 
to talk back to power” and to imagine “finer, better visions of human association”).
270. See WRIGHT, supra note 268, at 24–25 (arguing that developing achievable alterna-
tive social forms and institutions “depends upon the extent to which it is possible to formulate 
coherent, compelling strategies which both help create the conditions for implementing alter-
natives in the future and have the potential to mobilize the necessary social forces to support 
he alternative when those conditions occur”).
271. See IGOR SHOIKHEDBROD, REVISITING MARX’S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM:
RETHINKING JUSTICE, LEGALITY AND RIGHTS 6 (2019) (reminding that even the seemingly 
anti-liberal Marx regarded liberal rights “as a historical achievement” and a necessary precon-
dition to a future, more just society); CHARLES W. MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS:
THE CRITIQUE OF RACIAL LIBERALISM 13 (2017) (arguing in favor of an “emancipatory, radi-
cal liberalism” premised on the belief that shortcomings of liberal institutions are not imma-
nent features of the conceptual logic of political liberalism). Habermas felicitously described 
such a critical project as “suing” the redeem the real “normative content of bourgeois ideals.”
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY 282 (Frederick J. 
Lawrence trans., 1990).
272. For neoliberals in the Hayekian tradition, the situation is more complicated. It is by 
no means clear that neoliberals would reject the legal singularity on rule of law grounds, espe-
cially if it left intact market pricing mechanisms. Their categorical privileging of market price 
clearing as a social coordination device and their ambiguous, if not outright hostile, attitude 
toward democratic self-government mark a sharp fault line between them and writers in the 
classical liberal tradition. See supra text accompanying notes 162–174.
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in the critical tradition.
273
In fact, it is precisely in these writers that the nor-
mative force of the rule of law, and the potential impact of its dissolution, 
are most apparent. Very broadly speaking, authors in this tradition share an 
instinctual aversion to law’s purported universal and abstract quality—the 
precise virtues the liberal tradition prizes.
274
Instead, they argue that law’s
universality is a mystification that naturalizes an underlying system of ex-
ploitative social relations.
275
Christine Sypnowich summarizes this perspec-
tive well: “the role of law under capitalism . . . is the conception of law as a 
set of rules which, in their claim to devolve upon society a measure of for-
mal impartiality, equality, and freedom, serve to mystify the substantive un-
fairness, inequality, and alienation inherent in capitalist economic rela-
tions.”
276
We might expect that if anyone would be sanguine, if not enthusiastic, 
about the possibility of exposing the universality and predictability of law as 
problematic categories, it would be these writers. Nevertheless, the totalitar-
ian experience of the twentieth century compelled many critics of law to 
adopt a more ambivalent, even conciliatory, posture towards the rule of law, 
seeing it as a bulwark protecting legal subjects from arbitrary state vio-
lence.
277
All the while maintaining that the rule of law does frequently oper-
273. The use of the phrase “critical tradition” is complicated by the fact that there are 
many critical traditions in legal theory. See RICHARD NOBLES & DAVID SCHIFF, A
SOCIOLOGY OF JURISPRUDENCE 163 (2006). As used here, the term is intended to refer to ef-
forts to engage in a normative emancipatory critique, grounded in human reason, that seeks to 
overcome the law in its present instantiation and replace it with something better. In this re-
spect, it is not intended primarily to capture most legal realist critique (which concentrated its 
battle against what it perceived as formalistic reasoning that disguised law’s ineradicable inde-
terminacy), nor post-modern critiques of law (which tend to eschew emancipatory narratives 
and the centrality of human-centered reason and subjectivity).
274. See supra note 220 (citing several sources for this proposition).
275. See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW 139 (1982) (“[I]t is the principle of 
the Rule of Law itself which is the chief obstacle in the development of class conscious-
ness.”).
276. SYPNOWICH, supra note 166, at 8. It should be noted, however, that Sypnowich 
herself insists that socialist conceptions of law must leave room for certain liberal values. See 
id. at 26.
277. In addition to the authors discussed here in the text, Jürgen Habermas fits this de-
scription well. While his relationship to Marxism is complicated, his work as a social theorist 
arose out of and speaks most directly to the political left. See Terry Eagleton, In the Twilight 
Zone, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, May 12, 1994, https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v16/n09
/terry-eagleton/in-the-twilight-zone; Agnes Heller, Habermas and Marxism, in HABERMAS:
CRITICAL DEBATES 21 (1982). The trajectory of his thought, culminating in its latest system-
atic exposition Between Facts and Norms, ended up embracing a reinvigorated liberal legal-
ism as the solution by which to realize emancipated forms of social life about which citizens 
themselves must first reach an understanding. See HABERMAS, supra note 101, at xli; cf. also
HERBERT MARCUSE, THE ESSENTIAL MARCUSE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PHILOSOPHER AND 
SOCIAL CRITIC HERBERT MARCUSE 33–59 (Andrew Feenberg & William Leiss eds., 2007) 
(famous essay Repressive Tolerance, in which the leader of the 1960s American New Left 
argues in favor of realizing the unachieved potential of liberal ideals of tolerance and free 
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ate as the instrument or expression of dominant class interests, they 
acknowledged an unalloyed core of the rule of law to which all legal sys-
tems should aspire.
278
Franz Neumann, one of Europe’s greatest twentieth century political 
and legal theorists,
279
provides one such example. He discussed the danger
of underestimating the importance of law’s universality in Behemoth, his 
magisterial analysis of Nazi ideology, politics, and law.
280
To him, the rule 
of law entailed, above all else, an embrace of the universality principle, 
which he referred to as the “general character of law” and “equality before 
the law.”
281
His discussion of the rule of law emphasizes liberty as some-
thing above and beyond economic freedom:
Equality before the law is merely formal or negative, to be sure, but 
it does contain a minimum guarantee of freedom and must not be 
discarded. Both functions of the generality of law, calculability of 
the economic system and guarantee of a minimum of freedom and 
equality, are equally important; not the first alone, as the theories of 
the totalitarian state maintain. If one accepts their view that the 
generality of law is nothing more than a way of satisfying the needs 
of free competition, then the conclusion is inevitable that the substi-
tution of organized state capitalism for free competition requires
the substitution of the command of the Leader or the general prin-
ciple for the general law, the independent judiciary, and the separa-
tion of powers.
282
Importantly, Neumann sees the rule of law as a fundamentally negative, or 
“formal,” concept. Despite his radical political bona fides,
283
his post-war 
speech, albeit leading to an ultimately unsatisfying conclusion concerning how to distinguish 
between liberating tolerance and repressive tolerance).
278. See Scheuerman, supra note 229, at 2.
279. The clarification made with respect to Kirchheimer and law’s predictability is 
equally applicable here with respect to Neumann and law’s universality. The point is hardly 
that predictive legal analytics will lead to totalitarianism, but that these post-war writers re-
flected extensively on the complete erosion of rule of law principles, making their writings 
key reference points for the hypothetical thought experiment motivating the discussion here. 
See supra text accompanying notes 228–229.
280. To be sure, Neumann’s ultimate conclusion was that Nazi Germany was not gov-
erned by any system that could be described as law. See NEUMANN, supra note 120, at 467. 
The reader is invited to imagine how Neumann would characterize a purely algorithmic, post-
singularity legal system.
281. See id. at 441.
282. Id. at 444–45.
283. Neumann was affiliated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, a highly 
influential interdisciplinary research center with Marxist roots, and was considered by many 
of his Frankfurt associates to harbor more traditional Marxist views. See MARTIN JAY, THE 
DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE 
OF SOCIAL RESEARCH, 1923–1950 145 (rev. ed. 1996). For instance, in his pre-war writings 
Neumann argued in favor of a “social rule of law” that transcended the inherent limitations of 
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conception of the rule of law does not entail a positive commitment to 
achieve any particular system of social relations.
284
In the wake of the war, 
Neumann, a committed pre-war Marxist, trumpets the importance of nega-
tive liberty and describes the rule of law in terms of individual freedom and 
autonomy. In another passage, he notes that “the limited, formal, and nega-
tive generality of law under liberalism not only permits capitalist predicta-
bility, but also guarantees a minimum of freedom.”
285
So emphatic was 
Neumann’s association of the universal rule of law with freedom that, in his 
last book, he describes the rule of law as possessing a “moral” character that 
“transcends” any of its other roles.
286
English historian E.P. Thompson, like Neumann a twentieth-century in-
tellectual positioned markedly to the left of what passes for polite politics 
today, made a similarly full-throated defense of the rule of law.
287
To 
Thompson, the rule of law, which he associated above all with the univer-
sality principle,
288
was much more than an instrumental tool of the dominant 
class:
I am insisting only upon the obvious point . . . that there is a differ-
ence between arbitrary power and the rule of law. We ought to ex-
pose the shams and inequities which may be concealed beneath this 
law. But the rule of law itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions 
upon power and the defence of the citizen from power’s all-
intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human good. To 
deny or belittle this good is, in this dangerous century when the re-
sources and pretensions of power continue to enlarge, a desperate 
error of intellectual abstraction.
289
Thompson—again, like Neumann—valorizes the rule of law specifically in 
the context of the “dangerous century,” acknowledging the ominous legacy 
of twentieth century authoritarian governments that dissolved the rule of 
bourgeois liberal conceptions of legality, adequate to promote autonomous political and social 
life in mass industrial democracies. See, e.g., Franz Neumann, The Social Significance of the 
Basic Laws in the Weimar Constitution, 10 J. ECON. & SOC’Y 329 (1981) (originally pub-
lished in 1930).
284. In this respect, Neumann shares with Richardson and Raz a narrow conception of 
the rule of law. See supra Part III.A.
285. NEUMANN, supra note 120, at 451; see also Scheuerman, supra note 229, at 16.
286. See FRANZ NEUMANN, THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE:
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 170 (1957).
287. At the time they were published, Thompson’s comments were highly controversial 
among left-leaning legal theorists. See Morton J. Horowitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified 
Human Good?, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (“I do not see how a Man of the Left can de-
scribe the rule of law as ‘an unqualified human good’!”).
288. See THOMPSON, supra note 103, at 262 (defining the legal system in broad strokes 
as a body of rules and procedures applied logically with reference to standards of universali-
ty).
289. Id. at 266 (emphasis added).
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law. The passage also harkens back to the earlier discussion linking the rule 
of law to non-arbitrariness; if nothing else, the rule of law demands rea-
soned explanations from government, articulated in a manner that makes 
them susceptible to contestation.
290
Mere legal predictability, without this moral guarantee of equal treat-
ment, without this unqualified human good, would never definitively protect 
institutions and societies, whether putatively liberal or socialist, from arbi-
trary government. The danger, all too real for Neumann and his contempo-
raries, was that an autocratic or totalitarian regime might use the revelation 
of the incompleteness of the liberal rule of law not to better achieve univer-
sal law, but to eliminate whatever residual normative force that the rule of 
law retains. Indeed, in Neumann’s own time, Carl Schmitt, the “crown jurist 
of the Third Reich,”
291
helped justify arbitrary authoritarian government by 
pointing out the inability of liberalism to live up to its ideals in modern, in-
dustrial societies.
292
Will the acknowledgement that the legal singularity 
might destabilize the liberal rule of law give rise to calls to reinforce the le-
gitimacy of the liberal legal order by other means, or to a Schmittian “real-
ism” that resolves or resigns itself to fill the vacuum left by the rule of law 
with something perhaps more arbitrary—and perhaps more sinister?
All this is to say that lawyers and legal theorists, whatever their prior 
conceptions of rule-of-law discourse, should be acutely concerned about the 
dangers legal futurism poses to the rule of law. Broadly speaking, the possi-
ble responsive strategies fall into two non-mutually exclusive categories.
293
The first is to fight a defensive campaign in the realms of culture, media, 
politics, and, most obviously, within the legal system itself, to resist the un-
checked development of predictive legal technologies. Contrary to the futur-
ists’ prognostications about the unavoidability of technological advance, the 
steady march to a singularity is not a foreordained result. Technologies are 
always embedded in social institutions that have power to redirect techno-
logical change in the pursuit of social goals. An obvious possible response 
290. See Tushnet, supra note 190, at 2.
291. Charles E. Frye, Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, 28 J. POL. 818, 818 
(1966).
292. See RENATO CRISTI, CARL SCHMITT AND AUTHORITARIAN LIBERALISM: STRONG 
STATE, FREE ECONOMY 1–24 (1998); NEUMANN, supra note 120, at 42–45; cf. UNGER, supra
note 207, at 57 (characterizing Schmitt as an heir of Hobbes, the original weak-form rule of 
law theorist).
293. John Danaher, who coined the term “algocracy,” describes the two strategic pos-
tures as “resistance” and “accommodation.” See Danaher, supra note 10. The technology crit-
ic Astra Taylor has used a similar formulation in her interview with former Google executive 
(and fellow technology critic) Meredith Whittaker, contrasting “abolitionist” tactics with “re-
formist” tactics in confrontations with technological practices that are injurious to social well-
being. Demystifying Big Tech with Meredith Whittaker, THE DIG, at 1:58:00 (Sept. 25, 2020), 
https://www.thedigradio.com/podcast/demystifying-big-tech-with-meredith-whittaker; cf. 
BENJAMIN, supra note 98, at 109 (referring to “abolitionist tools” to curb socially harmful 
technologies).
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here would be to exercise the powers of unauthorized practice of law stat-
utes to restrict the usage of predictive legal analytics tools. State bar asso-
ciations could also play a defensive role by strategically restricting the us-
age of technologies by licensed lawyers to protect the rule of law. Debates 
about the advisability and feasibility of efforts to restrict legal technology 
have been ongoing for the better part of a decade by now, although their fo-
cus has been on traditional legal ethics
294
and the problem of bias.
295
To date, 
however, these debates have yet to acknowledge the endgame of the legal 
singularity, much less the ramifications thereof on the rule of law and the 
normative force of the legal order.
The second strategy is to make a tactical concession by accepting the 
demise of a certain conception of the rule of law, and focus instead on the 
reinforcement of other values and institutions that might lend normative 
force to the legal order. This Article has emphasized this theme throughout: 
the rule of law, while obviously important, is not unique in investing the le-
gal system with normative validity. Other values—including democratic 
self-government, political and social justice, transparency, rationality, due 
process, and human and civil rights—underwrite the normative foundations 
for existing and possible future institutional and doctrinal forms within the 
legal system. Earlier, we followed Richardson and Raz in adopting a narrow 
formulation of the rule of law, specifying that the rule of law’s importance 
as an antidote to arbitrary government was primarily attributable to the val-
ues of predictability and universality. In doing so, we rejected those more 
capacious accounts of the rule of law, which Raz referred to as “promiscu-
ous,” that include other liberal and democratic values. In the meantime, 
however, we preserved those values as a reserve resource from which we 
could draw later if necessary.
The reinforcement tactic referred to here could be conceptualized as an 
effort to replace the rule of law concept with new institutional and doctrinal 
forms founded on these other values. Ultimately, whether the normative va-
lidity of futurist law comes to depend on re-investing the rule of law with 
supplemental values or jettisoning the concept altogether in favor of build-
ing a new normative foundation for law oriented around those same values 
is a question of more theoretical than practical importance. Whatever its 
theoretical justification, a strategy of reinforcement will require scholars and 
lawyers working at the intersection of law and technology, whether they are 
inclined to critique or liberalism, to consider whether and how technological 
developments in the area of predictive legal analytics might catalyze a re-
294. See Josh Blackman, The Path of Big Data and the Law, in BIG DATA, BIG 
CHALLENGES IN EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING (H. Kumar Jayasuriya ed., 2015) (dis-
cussing ethical dilemmas posed by predictive legal technologies relating to client confidences, 
conflicts of interest, and the difficulty in assessing zealous representation).
295. See supra text accompanying notes 251–256.
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doubled commitment to making the algorithmizing of the legal system—
which, as even those readers skeptical of the singularity’s eventuality should 
recognize, is proceeding apace—amenable to deliberate forms of democrat-
ic control. Indeed, these efforts are already underway. The argument pre-
sented here about the rule of law simply underscores the urgency of those 
efforts. In this way, it becomes possible to imagine a future—perhaps even a 
bona fide futurist—legal system that, all the while attenuating the traditional 
rule of law as a legitimating force, might counterintuitively reinvigorate, or 
even help to reinvent, legal liberalism. Even critics of law and liberalism 
should find something worthwhile in this project.

